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1. Introduction 
 
  
 
George Orwell (1903 – 1950) and Anthony Burgess (1917 – 1993), two 
exceptional British authors, are best remembered for their dystopian novels 
Nineteen-Eighty-Four (Orwell) and A Clockwork Orange (Burgess), both of 
which are considered the two writers‟ magna opera. A dystopia may roughly 
be defined as the negative version of a utopia in which alarming tendencies 
of current social, political and scientific developments are projected in a 
calamitous culmination in the future. The genre became established and far 
more popular than its positive equivalent in the twentieth century, an age 
which brought us two world wars, the rise of totalitarian systems and the 
invention of the nuclear bomb (see Wenzl 30). Thus it is not very surprising 
that in an era full of radical social changes, omnipresent fear and circulating 
paranoid visions about the future, the world views of socio-critical science 
fiction writers, such as Orwell, Burgess and Aldous Huxley, were rather 
pessimistic and dark. Generally, dystopias present the reader with a future 
society in which citizens are repressed by a despotic government with their 
liberty and human rights being seriously infringed. This is certainly true for 
1984 and A Clockwork Orange, with both novels dealing with a disguised 
decaying England placed in a not too distant future. Both authors take up 
alarming political and scientific developments of their time and satirise them 
in order to demonstrate how dangerous and open to abuse they are.  
 
 
Orwell focuses on the aspect of totalitarianism and leader worship pointing 
out how propaganda, manipulation techniques and psychological thought 
control indoctrinate the human mind with ideological dogmas and lead to 
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complete intellectual submission on the part of those who accept and adopt 
the leadership‟s will without questioning it. Orwell‟s portrayal of all-pervasive 
government control, radical surveillance of the citizens and the massive 
interference in private lives has become a symbol of modern paranoia 
prophecies. Whenever the question of privacy is issued in current political 
discourse, connotations of George Orwell‟s fictional regime are conjured up 
by those who fear that certain Orwellian depictions may become true.  
 
 
In A Clockwork Orange Anthony Burgess presents us with the moral dilemma 
and the tension between behaviourist methods of social planning as 
propagated by B.F. Skinner and certain behaviourist psychologists in the 
1950ies, and the issue of human autonomy and individual choice. Skinner‟s 
ideas of conditioning and, therefore, shaping the human mind into whatever 
shape was desired, were openly discussed by politicians who considered 
adapting the methods to criminals in order to erase the “criminal instinct”. The 
underlying idea of Skinner‟s behaviourism is that there is no such thing as 
free will and that the human mind can be conditioned and the human 
behaviour modified. Anthony Burgess sensed the danger immanent in this 
ideology for he was convinced that a human being must be allowed to 
autonomously choose between good and evil without being forced to make a 
certain decision by somebody else.  
 
 
Both authors, Orwell and Burgess, touch upon the issue of human liberty, 
each emphasising another aspect of it. Whereas Orwell addresses the issue 
of political liberty, Burgess seems rather concerned with the metaphysical 
and psychological aspects of individual freedom. However, in order to 
profoundly analyse the aspects of liberty and its restrictions as depicted in 
both novels, it is necessary to grasp the notion of freedom as a philosophical 
concept and find a theory which can be adapted to Burgess and Orwell‟s 
works providing a common denominator for the two novels and thus enabling 
a comparison. For this purpose Isaiah Berlin‟s Two Concepts of Liberty 
provide a solid theoretical basis for further investigation. Thus, the main goal 
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of this thesis is to adapt Berlin‟s conception of positive and negative liberty to 
1984 and A Clockwork Orange and examine in more detail the serious 
infringement of human rights and the restrictions of liberty as outlined by the 
two novelists.  
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2. The Idea of Liberty 
 
 
Political philosophy concerns itself with theories which deal with the 
questions of political values and their adaptability to the real world. Among 
other values, such as justice, equality, neutrality, security, welfare, peace, 
liberty or freedom, has been in the centre of interest and inquiry of numerous 
philosophers and theorists for centuries. As far as terminology is concerned, 
liberty and freedom can be regarded as near synonyms. Also, they have 
been used more or less interchangeably by some philosophers, for instance 
by Isaiah Berlin in his essay Two Concepts of Liberty. However, they are 
regarded as slightly distinct as well. The political theorist Hanna Fenichel 
Pitkin points out that liberty implies a system of rules, a “network of restraint 
and order”. As a consequence, liberty is associated with political matters, 
whereas the term freedom is claimed to be more general with a meaning 
ranging “from an opposition to slavery to the absence of psychological or 
personal encumbrances.” (Nunberg ch.11) Therefore the term liberty can be 
restricted to political life, whereas freedom represents a more general 
concept or an idea (see Nunberg ch.1). However, the distinction between 
these terms is not of major importance for the purposes of the investigation in 
this thesis; hence we should regard the two terms as interchangeable. 
Moreover, they cannot be “translated into other European languages, which 
contain only the one term of either Latin or Germanic origin (e.g. liberté, 
Freiheit), where English contains both.” (Carter par.2 4)  
 
 
                                                          
1
 chapter.  
2
 paragraph. 
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Very few concepts other than freedom have been given so many multifarious 
and controversial interpretations depending on the conceptual framework and 
theoretical approach of different schools of philosophy; innumerable thinkers 
have dedicated their work to liberal concepts, countless works have been 
written on the topic of liberty. In general philosophers distinguish between 
two forms of freedom: on the one hand, outer freedom referring to political 
and social liberty, which is defined as the absence of outward restraints in 
reference to various kinds of action; on the other hand, inner freedom, which 
belongs to the field of metaphysics and psychology, and describes a state of 
autonomy in which an individual has the capacity to apply his or her free will 
in order to choose his or her course of action. 
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2.1. The Two Concepts of Liberty by Isaiah Berlin 
 
 
The most influential contribution to the modern intellectual discourse about 
freedom was made by Isaiah Berlin in his inaugural lecture Two Concepts of 
Liberty at Oxford University in 1958, where he elaborated on the distinction 
between positive and negative liberty, also designated as “liberty from” and 
“liberty to”. The lecture was published by Clarendon Press in 1958; it also 
appears in Berlin‟s Four Essays on Liberty (1969) and in a collection of 
essays called Liberty published in 2002 (see Carter note 1). Although Berlin 
was the one to examine the two concepts of liberty profoundly, the distinction 
as such is deeply rooted in philosophical tradition and can be traced back at 
least to Kant (see Carter par. 2). However, Berlin has provided and defined 
the formal framework of the differences between these two opposite 
perspectives. 
 
 
2.2. Negative Liberty 
 
 
 
In defining the notion of negative freedom, Berlin states: 
 
I am normally said to be free to the degree to which no man or body of 
men interferes with my activity. Political liberty in this sense is simply 
the area within which a man can  act unobstructed by others. If I am 
prevented by others from doing what I could otherwise do, I am to that 
degree unfree; and if this area is contracted by other men beyond a 
certain minimum, I can be described as being coerced, or, it may be, 
enslaved. Coercion is not, however, a term that covers every form of 
inability. If I say that I am unable to jump more than ten feet in the air, or 
cannot read because I am blind, or cannot understand the darker pages 
of Hegel, it would be eccentric to say that I am to that degree enslaved 
or coerced. Coercion implies the deliberate interference of other human 
beings within the area in which I  could otherwise act. You lack 
political liberty or freedom only if you are  prevented from attaining a 
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goal by human beings. Mere incapacity to attain a goal is not lack of 
political freedom. (Berlin 122) 
 
It is obvious that the notion of negative freedom focuses on freedom from 
outer interference. Therefore, negative freedom signifies an absence of 
something, i.e. the absence of barriers, obstacles, coercion etc. from the 
outside. According to Berlin, the most significant question in regard to 
negative liberty is as follows: What is the area within which an individual 
should be left alone to do or be what he or she is able to do or be without any 
interference from other persons? In other words, over what area am I master 
over my actions and what choices can I make without being restricted or 
forced to do something by somebody else? (see Open Learning ch.3.2) An 
important element of negative freedom is the factor that only restrictions 
imposed from other people affect my freedom, not my own inability to do 
something. Limitations on my actions due to laws of nature or my body are 
thus irrelevant to the discussion of political liberty.  
The criterion of oppression is the part that I believe to be played by 
other human beings, directly or indirectly, with or without the intention of 
doing so, in frustrating my wishes. By being free in this sense I mean 
not being interfered with by others. The wider the area of non-
interference, the wider my freedom. (Berlin 123) 
 
Central to the idea of negative liberty is the element of power relations within 
a political system and the exposure of tyranny and arbitrary exercise of 
authority. The question to be considered here is what legitimates political 
authorities to limit the liberty of individuals and how wide the area of non-
interference shall optimally be. The English Social Contract philosophers, for 
instance Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, have dedicated their work to this 
question supposing that the area of non-interference cannot be unlimited 
since it would result in a state in which everybody could interfere with 
everybody else. Social chaos and insecurity would produce a condition in 
which the “liberties of the weak would be suppressed by the strong” (Berlin 
123). In his prominent work Leviathan (1651) Hobbes proceeds from a 
negative image of humanity assuming that human actions and purposes do 
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not necessarily harmonise with each other. According to Hobbes, in a state of 
nature with unlimited natural freedoms without any restrictions by the law, an 
endless war of all against all would be the consequence. To avoid this state 
of chaos and war, people have to agree on a social contract establishing a 
civil society in which everybody has to submit to a government or sovereign 
power, renouncing some of their freedoms and gaining security, peace and 
civil rights in return (see Kunzmann, Burkard, and Wiedmann 117). This 
basically represents the principle of democratic societies.  
 
John Stuart Mill, a prominent nineteenth-century British thinker, who 
contemplated on the question of legal interference on the part of a 
government, articulates in his essay On Liberty a famous principle that has 
become known as the “Harm Principle”. The principle suggests that the only 
legitimate reason to limit the liberty of citizens is to prevent harm to others: 
The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as 
entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in 
the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be 
physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of 
public opinion. That principle is that the sole end for which mankind are 
warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of 
action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose 
for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a 
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His 
own good, either physical or moral, is not sufficient warrant. He cannot 
rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him 
to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinion of 
others, to do so would be wise, or even right... The only part of the 
conduct of anyone, for which he is amenable to society, is that which 
concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his 
independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body 
and mind, the individual is sovereign. (Mill 13) 
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2.3. Positive Liberty 
 
 
In general, thoughts about negative liberty basically centre on political and 
social liberty, that is to say, the absence of obstacles external to the subject 
and the range of possible options to choose from. Positive liberty, however, is 
a more complicated notion and rather difficult to grasp. In brief, it represents 
the inner freedom to do something rather than freedom from outer 
interference. Moreover, negative and positive freedom do not necessarily 
correlate with each other, for we may have all sorts of unlimited options, i.e. 
we may have a large amount of negative freedom, and still, we might not be 
able to take advantage of the opportunities because we are not in control of 
our life due to internal obstacles. It becomes clear that positive liberty is 
based upon the interaction between an inner capacity to take a rational 
option and a given opportunity. The concept of negative liberty, in contrast, is 
defined only through the available opportunities. Advocates of positive 
freedom believe that just because no one is preventing you from doing 
something, it does not necessarily mean that you are genuinely free. Positive 
freedom is regarded as a matter of achieving one‟s potential, not just having 
potential (see Open Learning ch3.3). 
 
Isaiah Berlin reckons that the positive notion of freedom derives from the 
wish of the agent to be his or her own master: 
I wish my  life  and  decisions  to  depend  on myself,  not  on  external  
forces  of whatever kind. I wish to be the instrument of my own, not of 
other men's, acts of will. I wish to be a subject, not an object;  to be 
moved by reasons, by conscious purposes, which are my own, not by 
causes which  affect me,  as  it were,  from  outside. I wish to be 
somebody, not nobody; a doer  - deciding, not being decided for, self-
directed and not acted upon by external nature or by other men as if I 
were a thing, or an animal, or a slave incapable of playing a human 
role, that is, of conceiving goals and policies of my own and realising 
them. This is at least part of what I mean when I say that I am  
rational, and  that  it  is my reason  that distinguishes me as a human 
being  from  the  rest of  the world.  I wish,  above  all,  to  be  
conscious  of myself  as  a  thinking, willing,  active  being,  bearing 
responsibility for my choices and able to explain them by reference to 
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my own ideas and purposes. I feel  free  to  the degree  that  I believe  
this  to be  true, and enslaved  to the degree that I am made to realise 
that it is not. (Berlin 131) 
 
However, Berlin annotates that although one may not be slave to someone 
else; one may yet be slave to nature or to one‟s own “unbridled passions” 
(132). In relation to this, he distinguishes between the “ideal”, “true” or 
“autonomous” self, which “is variously identified with reason, with “higher 
nature” and with the “self which calculates and aims at what will satisfy it in 
the long run” and the irrational and uncontrolled impulses, which represent 
the “lower nature” or the “empirical” and “heteronomous” self. These lower 
desires and passions, Berlin adds, need to be rigidly disciplined in order to 
realise the real nature of the true autonomous self (see 132). As an example, 
a person may attach great importance to a healthy way of life, and still be 
unable to quit smoking. In this case, the higher and true nature is a health-
conscious self, while smoking represents the irrational lower desires which 
have to be overcome in order to achieve true freedom. 
 
A highly debated example of Berlin‟s notion of positive liberty is the so-called 
paradox of the “contented slave”. If we proceed from the definition of positive 
freedom as being allowed to do what you want to do, then we notice that this 
notion of freedom implies that a slave who is perfectly satisfied with being a 
slave is totally free in a positive sense. However, our logic and linguistic 
intuition tells us that slaves are not free at all. The danger implied here lies in 
the conclusion that people who learn to desire fewer things will make 
themselves freer. Some theorists, for instance Richard Arneson and John 
Christman, try to avoid this paradox by saying that the desires of an 
individual should be “home grown”, that is to say, autonomously developed 
by the subject him/herself. As an example, let us consider the case of a 
Muslim woman who claims to support and agree with the fundamentalist 
doctrines of her society. According to advocates of positive liberty, this 
woman is unfree if her desire to conform is imposed upon her through 
manipulation or indoctrination. However, she is perfectly free, if she rationally 
and autonomously developed her desire to conform while being aware of 
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other options. So, even if this woman prefers and desires to live a submissive 
life, this does not necessarily mean that her freedom is being either 
enhanced or restricted due to her having these desires, for her freedom is not 
based on the content of these desires but on the mode of formation (see 
Carter ch.3). 
 
Taking the difference between positive and negative freedom into account, 
one might assume that political philosophers might focus exclusively on 
negative liberty, while positive liberty concerns more the area of psychology 
or individual morality. However, this is an oversimplified, insufficient train of 
thought, for one of the most discussed issues in political philosophy is the 
question whether the positive concept of freedom is a political subject-matter 
or not. Furthermore, what advantages does the state expect from promoting 
positive freedom of citizens? Philosophers in the classical liberal tradition, 
such as Constant, Humboldt, Spencer and Mill typically defend a negative 
concept of political freedom claiming that positive liberty is not a political 
subject at all. Philosophers critical of that tradition, like Rousseau, Hegel and 
Marx, on the other hand, defend a positive concept of political freedom 
promoting that political freedom can be achieved through political action (see 
Carter ch.1) 
 
 
Many theorists argue that positive freedom in its political form can only be 
achieved through a collective. According to Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
„individual freedom is achieved through participation in the process whereby 
one's community exercises collective control over its own affairs in 
accordance with the “general will” (see Carter ch.1). In relation to this, we can 
say that a democratic society is free in terms of being a self-determined 
society and that a member of a democratic society is free due to his or her 
participation in the democratic process. However, there are also individualist 
concepts of positive freedom. For instance, some theorists suggest that it is 
the task of a government to create the conditions necessary for its citizens to 
be self-sufficient and to achieve self-realisation (see Carter ch.1). 
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2.4. The Hazards of a Perverted Notion of Liberty  
 
 
One of the main points that Berlin makes in his Two Concepts of Liberty is 
that positive conceptions of freedom have been more frequently perverted 
and misused as instruments of political oppression than negative ones. 
Referring to the difference between the two selves, namely the true or 
rational and the lower or empirical self, Berlin demonstrates this paradox in 
the concept of positive liberty: 
 
Presently the two selves may be represented as divided by an even 
larger gap; the real self may be conceived as something wider than the 
individual (as the term is normally understood), as a social 'whole' of 
which the individual is an element or aspect: a tribe, a race, a Church, a 
State, the great society of the living and the dead and the yet unborn. 
This entity is then identified as being the 'true' self which, by imposing 
its collective, or 'organic', single will upon its recalcitrant 'members', 
achieves its own, and therefore their 'higher' freedom. The perils of 
using organic metaphors to justify the coercion of some men by others 
in order to raise them to a 'higher' level of freedom have often been 
pointed out. But what gives such plausibility as it has to this kind of 
language is that we recognise that it is possible, and at times justifiable, 
to coerce men in the name of some goal (let us say, justice or public 
health) which they would, if they were more enlightened, themselves 
pursue, but do not, because they are blind or ignorant or corrupt. This 
renders it easy for me to conceive of myself as coercing others for their 
own sake, in their, not my, interest. I am then claiming that I know what 
they truly need better than they know themselves. What, at most, this 
entails is that they would not resist me if they were rational and as wise 
as I and understand their interests as I do. (Berlin 132-133) 
 
 
Berlin even goes further explaining that by justifying coercion of others in the 
name of their true and real self – although they might not be aware of its 
existence due to its being belied by all that they overtly feel and do and say, 
that is by their empirical self - it becomes possible to 
 
ignore the actual wishes of men or societies, to bully, oppress, torture 
them in the name, and on behalf, of their 'real' selves, in the secure 
knowledge that whatever is the true goal of man (happiness, 
performance of duty, wisdom, a just society, self-fulfilment) must be 
identical with his freedom - the free choice of his 'true', albeit often 
submerged and inarticulate, self. (Berlin 133) 
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Thus, the ultimate debasement in such a situation is to be told that, despite 
evidence, what is going on cannot be named coercion, since it increases 
your positive freedom and serves your true self. As a matter of fact, Berlin 
holds that positive concepts of freedom have been used to justify some kinds 
of oppression in the course of history and that it is a „relatively short step from 
saying that freedom involves self-mastery to the justification of all kinds of 
state interference in the lives of individuals‟ or, as Rousseau says, it can, 
under certain circumstances, be right to be “forced to be free” (see Open 
Learning ch.3.4.) 
 
It is important to realise that in showing the dangers of a positive concept of 
liberty, Berlin does not condemn the conception as such being exclusively in 
favour of negative freedom. For this would be a misinterpretation of Berlin, 
since he just wants to emphasise that historically it was the positive notion of 
liberty that has been misused to justify paternalism, and moreover, 
oppression in the name of freedom. In an interview Berlin has expanded on 
this topic: 
 
The only reason for which I have been suspected of defending negative 
liberty against positive and saying that it is more civilized, is because I 
do think that the concept of positive liberty, which is of course essential 
to a decent existence, has been more often abused or perverted than 
that of negative liberty. Both are genuine questions; both are 
inescapable… Both these concepts have been politically and morally 
twisted into their opposites. George Orwell is excellent on this. People 
say „I express your real wishes. You may think that you know what you 
want, but I, the Fuhrer, we the Party Central Committee, know you 
better than you know yourself, and provide you with what you would ask 
for if you recognised your "real" needs.‟ Negative liberty is twisted when 
I am told that liberty must be equal for the tigers and for the sheep and 
hat this cannot be avoided even if it enables the former to eat the latter 
if coercion by the state is not to be used. Of course unlimited liberty for 
capitalists destroys the liberty of the workers, unlimited liberty for 
factory-owners or parents will allow children to be employed in the coal-
mines. Certainly the weak must be protected against the strong, and 
liberty to that extent be curtailed. Negative liberty must be curtailed if 
positive liberty is to be sufficiently realised; there must be a balance 
between the two, about which no clear principles can be enunciated. 
Positive and negative liberty are both perfectly valid concepts, but it 
seems to me that historically more damage has been done by pseudo-
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positive than by pseudo-negative liberty in the modern world. (qtd. in 
Jahanbegloo 41) 
 
Referring to the Führer and to the Party Central Committee, it becomes 
obvious that Berlin holds that in the twentieth century the totalitarian systems 
of Nazism and communism have perverted the notion of positive freedom by 
coercing their subjects, often against their will, to realise what the system‟s 
doctrine believed to be their „true‟ nature or „true‟ freedom. In other words, the 
word „freedom‟ has been misused to describe the power exercised by a 
collective self over its members (see Open Learning ch.3.4.). 
 
Berlin, himself a declared liberal, who was writing during the Cold War, 
clearly had some (leftist) totalitarian theories in mind, according to which 
freedom is a means of exercising collective control over one‟s destiny in a 
classless society, when he demonstrated the danger of perversion of positive 
liberty. Many theorists in favour of a positive conception, however, claim that 
the contortion of the idea as outlined by Berlin is too exaggerated, and 
therefore too polemic. Charles Taylor argues on this point: 
 
Even as applied to official Communism, this portrait is a little extreme, 
although it undoubtedly expresses the inner logic of this kind of theory. 
But it is an absurd caricature if applied to the whole family of positive 
conceptions. […] It has no necessary connection with the view that 
freedom consists purely and simply in the collective control over the 
common life, or that there is no freedom worth the name outside a 
context of collective control. And it does not therefore generate 
necessarily a doctrine that men can be forced to be free. (Taylor 175) 
 
Moreover, the negative concept can be misinterpreted and abused as well; it 
also contains a caricatured version within itself. This version goes back to 
Thomas Hobbes and Jeremy Bentham. It sees liberty simply as the absence 
of external legal or physical obstacles. This view completely disregards the 
aspect of inner, less obvious, obstacles, such as lack of awareness or false 
consciousness. If we understand freedom as individual self-realisation, then 
we must consider that self-realisation is something original to ourselves and 
can only be worked out independently and autonomously. Therefore, if we 
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think of freedom as including the freedom of self-fulfilment, then we have 
something which can fail or succeed for both inner and outer reasons. For, 
we can fail to achieve self-realisation due to inner obstacles as well as outer 
coercion. Thus, Hobbes‟s and Bentham‟s notion of negative freedom is 
insufficient if we want to safeguard each person‟s right to individual self-
fulfilment, which means to develop, determine and change his or her 
interests autonomously and from within. Taylor hence concludes that the 
moral psychology of Hobbes and Bentham is too simple and too crude for its 
purposes (see Taylor 176).  
 
Furthermore, we must not forget that if negative liberty in a distorted and 
extreme way means no interference at all and therefore no control from the 
outside, then the rights of the weak and defenceless members of a society 
are endangered due to a state of affairs in which the strong may be 
encouraged to exploit the weak according to a survival-of-the-fittest principle. 
This is exactly what Hobbes meant when he outlined the state of nature in 
which a war of all against all is the consequence of limitless freedom from 
outer restraints. 
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2.5. Final Solution?  
 
 
Berlin appears quite pessimistic when it comes to a reconcilement of different 
positions and values; or as he puts it, he does not believe in a „final solution.‟ 
He further claims that, historically, the belief in a final solution, i.e. in a 
harmony of all the different goals and values humans have, is „responsible for 
the slaughter of individuals on the altars of the great historical ideals‟ more 
than any other belief. Eventually, he concludes that there is no way of 
harmonising human values, since these are in principle irreconcilable: 
 
It is a commonplace that neither political equality nor efficient 
organisation nor social justice is compatible with more than a modicum 
of individual liberty, and certainly not with unrestricted laissez-faire; that 
justice and generosity, public and private loyalties, the demands of 
genius and the claims of society, can conflict violently with each other. 
And it is no great way from that to the generalisation that not all good 
things are compatible, still less all the ideals of mankind. But 
somewhere, we shall be told and in some way, it must be possible for 
all these values to live together, for unless this is so, the universe is not 
a cosmos, not a harmony; unless this is so, conflicts of value may be an 
intrinsic irremovable element in human life. To admit that the fulfilment 
of some of our ideals may in principle make the fulfilment of others 
impossible is to say that the notion of total human fulfilment is a formal 
contradiction, a metaphysical chimera. (Berlin 167-168) 
 
 
Isaiah Berlin‟s contribution to the discussion about freedom has started off a 
lively dispute and inspired numerous theorists to investigate further into the 
topic of positive and negative liberty. Some have tried to demonstrate that 
only the negative concept deserves the name liberty, others tried to point out 
the advantages of the positive concept. Some have even attempted to find a 
third way reconciling the two ideas by finding a basic agreement between the 
two sides. The American legal philosopher Gerald MacCallum, for instance, 
argued that while there are various possible interpretations of freedom, there 
is only one basic concept which allows the dichotonomous versions to 
converge. MacCallum defines the basic concept, a concept on which 
everyone agrees, as a triadic relation which consists of a subject or agent, 
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certain preventing conditions, and certain doings or becomings of the agent 
(see Carter ch.4). According to this theory, an agent is free from certain 
preventing conditions, to do or become certain things.  
  
Any claim about the presence or absence of freedom in a given 
situation will therefore make certain assumptions about what counts as 
an agent, what counts as a constraint or limitation on freedom, and 
what counts as a purpose that the agent can be described as either free 
or unfree to carry out. (Carter ch.4) 
 
 
MacCallum‟s argumentation admittedly appears quite plausible and 
adjustable to the question of liberty, and also the other discussions and 
theories provide deep insights into the topic and are certainly worth further 
investigations; however, the theoretical framework of this paper mainly builds 
on the dichotomy of positive and negative liberty as defined by Berlin. 
Discussing all the freedom theories currently available would go beyond the 
scope of this thesis and, finally, Berlin‟s distinction perfectly fits as the 
conceptual basis for the aspects of freedom, or rather its perversions, as 
illustrated by Orwell and Burgess.   
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3. The Manifestations of Negative Liberty in 1984 
 
 
3.1. Orwell’s Warning 
 
In order to analyse the aspects of liberty and its limitations in George Orwell‟s 
masterpiece novel 1984, which was completed in the year 1948 and 
published in 1949, it is worth first taking a look at the totalitarian system of 
the dystopian state of Oceania and its characteristics as illustrated in the 
novel. Orwell depicts the future in the year 1984 as a dark place full of 
hatred, terror and political paranoia. It should be noted that while the story, as 
is usual in utopian or dystopian fiction, is set in the future, it is in fact a 
critique of Orwell‟s own present. What the author has done is to “deliberately 
exaggerate a number of contemporary tendencies”, such as the increasing 
invasion of privacy, the corruption of language, the dangers of mass media 
manipulation etc., “in order to satirise them in the form of fiction” (Hammond 
172). Orwell himself wrote to an American correspondent in 1949: 
I do not believe that the kind of society I describe necessarily will arrive, 
but I believe (allowing of course for the fact that the book is a satire) 
that something resembling it could arrive. I believe also that totalitarian 
ideas have taken root in the minds of intellectuals everywhere, and I 
have tried to draw these ideas out to their logical consequences. (qtd. in 
Hammond 172) 
 
The book is meant as a warning against totalitarianism and it must not by any 
means be interpreted simply as an anti-Communist treatise, for it is a satire 
on the worst features of both Communist and Nazi regimes and on 
totalitarian systems in general. “The author is too deeply and too seriously an 
enemy of Bolshevism and of any kind of mass tyranny for his book to be 
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merely anti-Russian. […] Orwell‟s only theme is the totalitarian danger that 
lies within ourselves and in all the political systems of our time” (Mann 277). 
In fact, Orwell derived the political framework for the story from his 
experiences in Spain: “the one-party state, the denial of objective truth, the 
manipulation of the past, imprisonment without trial, torture, indifference to 
human suffering” (Hammond 172). Furthermore, the scene of the book is laid 
in Britain in order to emphasise that the English-speaking nations are not 
resistant against totalitarian tendencies and that these could flourish 
anywhere if not fought against (see Hammond 173). 
 
Intending to analyse the totalitarian system of Oceania we should take a 
closer look at Emmanuel Goldstein‟s book, which gives us insight into the 
mechanisms of the Ingsoc Party and its doctrine. Emmanuel Goldstein, the 
Party‟s main enemy, “the Enemy of the People” (1984 13) to whom the daily 
Two Minutes Hate ritual is commonly dedicated, had once been one of the 
leading figures of the Party before he engaged in counter-revolutionary 
activities; then - condemned to death - he had somehow managed to escape 
and disappear mysteriously in the underground, as the Party legend teaches 
us. “He was the primal traitor, the earliest defiler of the Party‟s purity. All 
subsequent crimes against the Party, all treacheries, acts of sabotage, 
heresies, deviations, sprang directly out of his teaching.” (1984 14)  
 
In fact, the figure of Goldstein represents a very useful device for the 
purposes of the Party for two reasons: First, his face is usually used in the 
Two Minutes Hate ceremony in order to provide the people with a catalyst for 
their unfiltered hatred and unconscious aggressions towards the Party itself. 
Second, possibly being just a convenient fiction of the regime (see Zwerdling 
108), he is used for detecting thoughtcriminals, i.e. Party traitors. These are 
usually allured with the alleged conspiracy and its doctrine written by 
Goldstein. Although we may assume that there is no such thing as an 
underground organisation at all and that the conspirative book was written by 
O‟Brian himself or some other member of the Inner Party, its content still 
provides us with profound information about the functioning of the Party and 
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its programmes and final aims by examining the main principles of the 
system as represented in the Party slogans: War is Peace, Freedom is 
Slavery, Ignorance is Strength. 
 
 
 
3.2. The Theory and Practice of Oligarchical Collectivism  
 
Goldstein‟s book, The Theory and Practice of Oligarchical Collectivism, be it 
real or fake, teaches us that societies in general always consist of three 
classes of people: the High, the Middle and the Low. These classes struggle 
for power and change positions, but the essential structure of society usually 
remains triadic. Viewed in this light, history is perceived as a recurrent 
circular pattern:  
 
Thus throughout history a struggle which is the same in its main 
outlines recurs over and over again. For long periods the High seem to 
be securely in power, but sooner or later there always comes a 
moment when they lose either their belief in themselves or their 
capacity to govern efficiently, or both. They are then overthrown by the 
Middle, who  enlist the Low to on their side by pretending to them that 
they are fighting for liberty and justice. As soon as they have reached 
their objective, the Middle thrust the Low back into their old position of 
servitude, and they become the High. Presently a new Middle group 
splits off from one of the other groups or from both of them and the 
struggle begins over again. (1984 210) 
 
Further, the Middle, striving for power, has always pretended to be fighting 
for values such as freedom, justice, equality and fraternity; but as soon as the 
old tyranny is overthrown, the Middle establishes a new one. However, in 
1984 the new Middle groups who emerged from the Socialist theories of the 
early nineteenth century openly proclaimed their aims of destroying freedom 
and perpetuating inequality: 
 
 21 
 
Socialism, a theory which appeared in the early nineteenth century and 
was the last link in a chain of thought stretching back to the slave 
rebellions of antiquity, was still deeply infected by the Utopianism of 
past ages. But in each variant of Socialism that appeared from about 
1900 onwards the aim of establishing liberty and equality was more and 
more openly abandoned. The new movements which appeared in  the 
middle years of the century, Ingsoc in Oceania, Neo-Bolshevism in 
Eurasia, Death-Worship, as it is commonly called, in Eastasia, had the 
conscious aim of perpetuating unfreedom and inequality. These new 
movements, of course, grew out of the old ones and tended to keep 
their names and pay lip-service to their ideology. But the purpose of all 
of them was to arrest progress and freeze history at a chosen moment. 
(1984 211-212) 
 
What we have in the year 1984 is a world divided into three great super-
states, Oceania, Eurasia and Eastasia, each state having a similar political 
structure based on Socialist philosophies, however perverted into an extreme 
form of authoritarianism, whereby the power is always exercised by a one-
party system. The form of such a government is called Oligarchical 
Collectivism, as Goldstein indicates. An oligarchy is by definition a 
“government by a few, especially by a small faction of persons or families” or 
simply “a state governed by a few persons” (see The Free Dictionary). 
Collectivism, again, is understood as the “political principle of centralised 
social and economic control, esp. of all means of production” and distribution. 
Yet, it is also associated with Soviet communism, i.e. Bolshevism and 
consequently with the “political theory that the people should own the means 
of production” (see Dictionary.com). 
 
Due to Goldstein, the only secure basis for oligarchy is collectivism due to the 
fact that wealth and privilege are best defended when they are possessed 
jointly. „The so-called “abolition of private property‟ [...] meant, in effect, the 
concentration of property in far fewer hands than before” (1984 214). The 
difference to previous times was that the new wealth owners were a 
collective group instead of a mass of individuals. “Individually, no member of 
the Party owns anything [...]. Collectively, the Party owns everything in 
Oceania, because it controls everything, and disposes of the products as it 
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thinks fit” (1984 215). The whole Revolution in 1984 could, therefore, 
succeed almost unopposed, because it was represented to the people as a 
process of collectivisation (see 1984 215). 
 
The question to be considered is how these new forms of extreme totalitarian 
doctrines could arise and gain power so easily. According to Goldstein‟s 
book, with the development of machine production human equality had 
become technically possible and it was no longer necessary to have different 
social or economic classes. Yet, this state of equality was no longer a 
desirable ideal for the groups that were seeking power, but a danger to be 
averted. In earlier times, when a just and peaceful society was in fact not 
possible, it had been easy to proclaim freedom, human rights, equality before 
the law etc. and make the masses believe in those values. However, at 
exactly the point in time when the realisation of these values was actually 
possible, the liberal and egalitarian ideas were abandoned and new forms of 
authoritarianism and dictatorship took over (see 1984 213).  
Every new political theory, by whatever name it called itself, led back to 
hierarchy and regimentation. And in the general hardening  of outlook 
that set in round about 1930, practices which had been long 
abandoned, in some cases for hundreds of years – imprisonment 
without trial, the use of war prisoners as slaves, public executions, 
torture to extract confessions, the use of  hostages and the deportation 
of whole populations – not only  became common again, but were 
tolerated and even defended by  people who considered themselves 
enlightened and progressive. (1984 213) 
 
In Oceania the realisation of such a new authoritarian form of government 
meant the abolishment of the liberal and capitalist tradition through a 
revolution and the enforcement of Ingsoc: grown out of the earlier Socialist 
movement and inheriting its phraseology, it stands for English Socialism 
referring to both the one-party government and its underlying philosophy. The 
new aristocracy, made up of the former middle class and upper working class 
people, were, as “compared with their opposite numbers in past ages”, 
“hungrier for pure power” and more aware of what they were doing (see 1984 
214). Thus, after a revolutionary period, which lasted almost two decades, a 
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new triadic hierarchical society regrouped itself now consisting of the Inner 
Party, the new High, the Outer Party, the Middle, and the proles, the Low. At 
the top of the pyramidal structure is Big Brother, the leader of the Party, 
although there is considerable uncertainty about his real existence. For, we 
may well assume that he, though he might have been the founder of the 
Party or one of the leading heads of the Revolution, is just a symbol for the 
corpus of the Party itself and as such used to provide the people with a 
leading figure they can believe in, worship and fear. Naturally, it is easier to 
feel such emotions towards an individual than towards an organisation, i.e. a 
political party.  
Big Brother is infallible and all-powerful. Every success, every 
achievement, every victory, every scientific discovery, all knowledge, all 
wisdom, all happiness, all virtue, are held to issue directly from his 
leadership and inspiration. Nobody has ever seen Big Brother. He is a 
face on the hoardings, a voice on the telescreen. We may be 
reasonably sure that he will never die, and there is already considerable 
uncertainty as to when he was born. Big Brother is the guise in which 
the Party chooses to exhibit itself  to the world. (1984 216-217) 
 
The actual power springs from the Inner Party which makes up not more than 
two percent of the whole population of Oceania and functions as the brain of 
the state. Below them comes the Outer Party, the „hands‟ of the Inner Party; 
and finally, below that come the proles, the vast masses, numbering about 
eighty-five percent of the population, yet having no political relevance at all. 
Basically, membership of these three groups is not hereditary but decided 
upon by examination which takes place at the age of sixteen and in which 
race and gender do not play any particular role. On the contrary, “Jews, 
Negroes, South Americans of pure Indian blood are to be found in the 
highest ranks of the Party” (1984 217).  
 
The four main institutions to execute the Party‟s will, the organs between the 
entire apparatus of government is divided, are represented by the four 
ministries: The Ministry of Truth, The Ministry of Peace, The Ministry of Love 
and The Ministry of Plenty.  
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The Ministry of Truth, which concerned itself with news, entertainment, 
education and the fine arts. The Ministry of Peace, which concerned 
itself with war. The Ministry of Love, which maintained law and order. 
And the Ministry of Plenty, which was responsible for economic affairs. 
Their names, in Newspeak: Minitrue, Minipax, Miniluv and Miniplenty. 
(1984 6) 
 
In fact, these organs of government are and do exactly the opposite of what 
they claim to be and do, for instance, Minitrue is concerned with propaganda, 
manipulation and falsification of facts, whereas Miniluv is actually concerned 
with torture and the imprisonment of criminals and political enemies. Their 
common final aim, however, is the limitation and destruction of human 
freedom, both in a positive and negative sense. For, what we have in 
Oceania is an extremely authoritarian regime which regulates each aspect of 
human political, economic and private life. 
 
 
 
3.3. Limitations of Negative Liberty  
 
 
If we want to take a look at the aspects of the negative concept of liberty as 
depicted by Berlin in Orwell‟s novel, bearing in mind that negative liberty is 
understood as the absence of outer interference or the area over which an 
individual is master over his or her actions and choices without being 
restricted or forced to do something by somebody else, then we can say that 
factually there is no liberty at all in 1984 since the regime interferes in 
practically each and every area of life. For instance, the freedom of 
movement has been completely abolished. That is, a citizen of Oceania is not 
allowed to leave his habitat, let alone his country. Moreover, any contact with 
the outer world, i.e. with any foreigner, and even the knowledge of foreign 
languages, is strictly forbidden in order to safeguard the sealing-off of the 
citizens to keep them and their worldviews under control. For, if they were 
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allowed contact with foreigners, they would possibly open up their horizons 
and realise that they have been told lies and manipulated by the government.  
 
Further, human rights as known to us and taken for granted, at least in the 
modern western world, do not exist in Orwell‟s dystopian state; as a matter of 
fact they are systematically ignored and violated. Article 1 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, “All human beings are born free and equal in 
dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should 
act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood,” (United Nations Art. 1) 
appears as purest cynicism in a state which proclaims that freedom is in fact 
slavery. Another very prominent Article in the UDHR, saying that “No one 
shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment” is also drastically infringed by the Ministry of Love. Since torture 
is an extreme form of intervention from outside it represents a radical attack 
on the „negative‟ aspect of human liberty.  
 
Moreover, there is no freedom of speech, no freedom of assembly, no 
freedom of education, no freedom of the press, no freedom of association, no 
intellectual freedom, no sexual freedom and, finally, no freedom of thought. A 
citizen of Oceania, or more specifically a Party member, has no freedom of 
choice concerning his or her education, habitat, employment, life-partner, 
friends, hobbies, etc. All these violations of human rights and restrictions of 
opportunities, hence restrictions of liberty in a negative sense, serve one 
single purpose, namely to permanently safeguard the maintenance of power 
of the Party. And it is exactly this strict regimentation and control over its 
citizens that makes the Party so efficient and successful: 
 By comparison with that existing today, all the tyrannies of the past 
 were half-hearted and inefficient. The ruling groups were always 
 infected to some extent by liberal ideas, and were content to leave 
 loose ends everywhere, to regard only the overt act and to be 
 uninterested in what their subjects were thinking. Even the Catholic 
 Church of the Middle Ages was tolerant by modern standards. Part 
 of the reason for this was that in the past no government had the 
 power to keep its citizens under constant surveillance. (1984 214) 
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3.4. “Big Brother is Watching You” 
 
 
It is safe to assume that the most evident violation of human liberty in a 
negative sense is represented by the constant surveillance of the citizens 
and the total invasion of private life in Oceania. Orwell appears to be 
especially critical of technological progress warning us against the dangers of 
mass media and the misuse of modern communication systems for 
surveillance:  
 The invention of print, however, made it easier to manipulate public 
 opinion, and the film and the radio carried the process further. With 
 the development of television, and the technical advance which 
 made it possible to receive and transmit simultaneously on the 
 same instrument, private life came to an end. Every citizen, or at 
 least every citizen important enough to be worth watching, could be 
 kept for twenty-four hours a day under the eyes of the police and in 
 the sound of the official propaganda, with all other channels of 
 communication closed. (1984 214) 
 
Telescreen, the technological device which makes constant surveillance 
possible, - a television screen which on the one hand transmits propaganda 
programs, and in this way adds to the constant manipulation, and, on the 
other hand, functions as a video camera which observes the citizens - has 
become the symbol of modern paranoia prophecies since Orwell‟s 1984. 
Orwell himself, though to a certain extent aware of the prophetic nature of his 
novel, might still have never dared to believe how close to reality his dark 
vision of permanent surveillance in the twenty-first century would come.  In 
Oceania, the author places a telescreen in members‟ of the Outer Party 
apartments, everywhere in the streets, in public places, in public buildings – 
basically everywhere except for the districts where the proles live. In places 
where no telescreens could be placed, for instance outside the city in the 
countryside, microphones have been installed instead so that conversations 
can be eavesdropped.  
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Over and beyond this, one has to fear one‟s closest fellow men, for 
everybody could turn out a denunciator. Especially one‟s own children 
represent a serious danger since they are members of the so called Spies – 
an organisation for children comparable to the Hitler Youth.  As the name 
itself suggests, they spy upon their parents and other grown-ups in order to 
find evidence for suspicious behaviour which they then report to the Thought 
Police, i.e. to the ultimate executive agency. The chief task of the Thought 
Police is to uncover Party traitors and to transfer them to the Ministry of Love, 
where they have to confess to their crimes usually exposed to various 
methods of torture. People arrested by the Thought Police simply disappear 
as if they had never existed. Their whole existence is simply negated and 
deleted from the records: 
It was always at night – the arrests invariably happened at night. The 
sudden jerk out of sleep, the rough hand shaking your  shoulder, the 
lights glaring in your eyes, the ring of hard faces round the bed. In the 
vast majority of cases there was no trial, no report of the arrest. People 
simply disappeared, always during the night. Your name was removed 
from the registers, every record of everything that you had ever done 
was wiped out, your one-time existence was denied and then forgotten. 
You were abolished, annihilated: vaporized was the usual word. (1984 
21) 
 
Members of the Outer Party are especially kept under observation of the 
government. The Thought Police actually controls everything they do, say, or 
even think in order to notice any unorthodox behaviour that would expose 
them as traitors of the Party. As a result, the Party members live in the 
knowledge that everything they do or say can and will be used against them. 
Even very subtle things, like mimic or gesture, are scrutinised closely in 
respect to suspicious behaviour: 
 It was terribly dangerous to let your thoughts wander when you 
 were in any public place or within range of a telescreen. The 
 smallest thing could give you away. A nervous tick, an unconscious 
 look of anxiety, a habit of muttering to yourself – anything that 
 carried with it the suggestion of abnormality, of having something to 
 hide. In any case, to wear an improper expression on your face (to 
 look incredulous when a victory was announced, for example) was 
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 itself a punishable offence. There was even a word for it in 
 Newspeak: facecrime, it was called. (1984 65) 
 
Ultimately, members of the Outer Party have no possibility to cultivate any 
form of privacy; on the contrary, individuality is more or less forbidden and 
made almost impossible. Party members are expected to go to work, spend 
their evenings at the Community Centres, and then go to sleep, naturally 
being permanently under surveillance of the telescreens: 
In principle, a Party member had no spare time, and was never alone 
except in bed. It was assumed that when he was not working, eating or 
sleeping he would be taking part in some kind of communal recreation; 
to do anything that suggested a taste for  solitude, even to go for a walk 
by yourself, was always slightly dangerous. There was a word for it in 
Newspeak: ownlife, it was called, meaning individualism and 
eccentricity. (1984 85) 
 
Hence, the smallest evidence of individuality is regarded as dangerous, since 
it could hint at unorthodox and therefore contra-revolutionary, i.e. non-
conformist disposition, which, of course, the regime seeks to eliminate.  
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3.5. The Role of Sexuality in 1984 
 
In addition to the surveillance issue, the strict regulation of sexuality by the 
government represents another distinct invasion of privacy in Oceania and 
consequently a serious restriction of negative liberty. Since private 
interpersonal relationships are undesirable and viewed with greatest mistrust 
by the regime, sexual intercourse between unmarried Party members is 
forbidden: “The unforgivable crime was promiscuity between Party 
members.” (1984 68) 
The aim of the Party was not merely to prevent men and women from 
forming loyalties which it might not be able to control. Its real, 
undeclared purpose was to remove all pleasure from the sexual act. Not 
love so much as eroticism was the enemy, inside marriage as well as 
outside it. (1984 68) 
 
Marriages, all of which have to be approved by the regime, serve only one 
purpose: to “beget children for the service of the Party” (1984 68). As a 
consequence, sexual intercourse is allowed only in marriages for the purpose 
of procreation. Sex, therefore, represents a necessary evil, something vile 
and nasty, yet indispensable for the continuity of mankind and thus the 
continuity of the Party: 
Sexual intercourse was to be looked on as a slightly disgusting minor 
operation, like having an enema. This again was never put  into plain 
words, but in indirect way it was rubbed into every Party member from 
childhood onwards. There were even organisations such as the Junior 
Anti-Sex league which advocated complete celibacy for both sexes. […] 
The Party was trying to kill the sex instinct, or, if it could not be killed, 
then to distort it and dirty it. (1984 69) 
 
Organisations such as the Spies and the Junior Anti-Sex League, sex talk in 
school, various lectures etc. appear successfully in discrediting and 
demoralising the sexual desire. Winston Smith‟s wife Katharine represents a 
typical example of an orthodox, Party loyal, chaste woman, who despises the 
sexual act, however, persists on producing a child and thus fulfilling her “duty 
to the Party” (1984 139). Winston, however, is disgusted by his wife‟s weekly 
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copulation efforts, not because he is chaste and despises sex as well, but 
because he is horrified by the cold and passionless atmosphere in bed with 
his wife: “To embrace her was like embracing a jointed wooden image.” 
(1984 70) What he desires is real intimacy and unbridled passion: 
 And what he wanted, more even than to be loved, was to break 
 down that wall of virtue, even if it were only once in his whole life.  The 
sexual act, successfully performed, was rebellion. Desire was 
 thoughtcrime. (1984 71) 
 
Naturally, the Party must be aware of the fact that the sexual instinct cannot 
be eroded so easily; that is why consorting with prostitutes, although 
forbidden, represents “one of those rules that you could occasionally nerve 
yourself to break” (1984 68).  
 Tacitly the Party was even inclined to encourage prostitution, as an 
 outlet for instincts which could not be altogether suppressed. Mere 
 debauchery did not matter very much, so long as it was furtive and 
 joyless, and only involved the women of a submerged and despised 
 class. (1984 68) 
 
Why does the Party seek to control the sexual instincts of its members? What 
is the purpose and the “inner meaning of the Party‟s sexual Puritanism” 
(1984 139)?  Julia, Winston‟s lover and partner in crime, points out that there 
is a direct relationship between the repression of lust and the worship of Big 
Brother and the Party: 
It was not merely that the sex instinct created a world of its own 
 which was outside the Party‟s control and which therefore had to be 
 destroyed if possible. What was more important was that sexual 
 privation induced hysteria, which was desirable because it could  be 
transformed into war-fever and leader-worship. (1984 139) 
 
What Julia here touches upon is the phenomenon of sublimation, which is 
according to Sigmund Freud‟s psychoanalytic theory a strong defence 
mechanism that transforms repressed sexual energy into useful social and 
cultural achievements. Since in Oceania‟s society leader-worship and war 
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hysteria is regarded as socially useful, the Party wants to make use of this 
defence mechanism and employ it for its own purposes: 
There was a direct, intimate connection between chastity and 
 political orthodoxy. For how could the fear, the hatred and the 
 lunatic credulity which the Party needed in its members be kept at  the 
right pitch, except by bottling down some powerful instinct and 
 using it as a driving force? The sex impulse was dangerous to the 
 Party, and the Party had turned it to account. (1984 140) 
 
That is the reason why the sexual act successfully performed is an act of 
rebellion and liberation from the Party doctrine. It represents a revolt against 
the principles of Ingsoc because it is a retreat into privacy that creates a 
sense of togetherness, which is, certainly, dangerous to the purposes of the 
Party. Further, for the same reason the Party has infiltrated family life in 
general and subverted the instinct of parenthood. Families, of course, could 
not actually be abolished. However, children “were systematically turned 
against their parents and taught to spy on them and report their deviations. 
[…] It was a device by means of which everyone could be surrounded night 
and day by informers who knew him intimately.” (1984 140) This represents 
another invasion of privacy, for sheltered family life and genuine parent-child 
cohesion is simply brought to nought by the regime.  
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3.6. The Mutability of the Past 
 
Let us again recall the meaning of negative liberty as the absence of 
obstacles external to the subject and the extent of possible options to choose 
from, and compare it to the alternation of the past on the part of The Ministry 
of Truth. “Who controls the past […] controls the future; who controls the 
present controls the past,” runs one of the main Party slogans (1984 37). In 
1984 the regime controls the past and therefore the present as well by 
constant falsification of historical facts. The permanent deception of the 
citizens through the concealment of facts can be seen as an external 
obstacle to the establishment of the truth.  Not only does the Ingsoc system 
limit the freedom of information, it annuls it entirely.  
 
The Ministry of Truth, which is the only source of information in Oceania, is 
thus concerned with news media, entertainment, educational books, 
research, arts, pornography, music, tele-programmes etc. Its main purpose is 
to change the facts to fit into the Party doctrine for propaganda effects. For 
example, if Big Brother makes an announcement that later turns out to be 
wrong, then the employees of the Ministry of Truth have to rewrite and alter 
his announcement in the aftermath so that any forecast Big Brother 
previously made appears accurate. In fact, the deeper reason for the Party‟s 
ambition to control all records and, therefore, to control all memories is to 
maintain the illusion that the Party is absolute and impeccable. It cannot ever 
appear to make mistakes or change its mind, for this would imply weakness 
and imperfection. To maintain power, however, the Party has to appear 
never-failing and eternally right (see Wikipedia ch. 2). 
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3.7. Are the Proles Free? 
 
All the excessive confinements of liberty in the novel are only imposed on the 
middle class, i.e. to the members of the Outer Party. The members of the 
ruling class, that is the Inner Party, enjoy much more freedom, for instance, 
they are allowed to turn their home telescreens off. Interestingly enough, 
nobody seems to care what the overwhelming majority of the citizens, the 
proles, who make up about eighty-five percent of the total population, think or 
do (see LaPicho par. 2). The proles, who can be identified as the working 
class, live in rundown, sordid parts of London where they are seemingly let 
alone to live their life as they wish to. The Party simply does not regard them 
as politically relevant in any sense since they are perceived as naturally 
inferior, “like animals” (1984 74) and therefore not dangerous to the system. 
“So long as they continued to work and breed, their other activities were 
without importance.” (1984 74) The Party does not even make any attempts 
to indoctrinate them with its ideology, on the contrary, it is even “not desirable 
that the proles should have strong political feelings” (1984 74). 
The great majority of proles did not even have telescreens in their 
homes. Even the civil police interfered with them very little. There was a 
vast amount of criminality in London, a whole world-within-a-world of 
thieves, bandits, prostitutes, drug-peddlers and  racketeers of every 
description; but since it all happened among the proles themselves, it 
was of no importance. In all questions of  morals they were allowed to 
follow their ancestral code. The sexual puritanism of the Party was not 
imposed upon them. Promiscuity went unpunished, divorce was 
permitted. For that matter, even religious worship would have been 
permitted if the proles had  shown any sign of needing or wanting it. 
They were beneath suspicion. As the Party slogan put it: „Proles and 
animals are free.‟ (1984 75) 
 
If we apply the negative concept of liberty, it is justified to say that the proles 
are indeed free, or at least substantially freer than the Outer Party members. 
The question that still needs to be answered is why does the Party utterly 
disregard the proles and exclude them completely from its political 
programme? This is because the party considers it impossible that the proles 
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could ever rebel on their own, enforce a political uprising and subsequently 
overthrow the system. As long as any potential rebellion within the Party itself 
is prevented, everything appears safe. O‟Brian reflects upon this issue: 
 […] perhaps you have returned to your old idea that the proletarians 
 or the slaves will arise and overthrow us. Put it out of your mind. 
 They are helpless, like the animals. Humanity is the Party. The 
 others are outside – irrelevant. (1984 282) 
 
Winston Smith believes that “if there is hope, […], it lies in the proles” (1984 
72). However, he himself detects that: “Until they become conscious they will 
never rebel, and until after they have rebelled they cannot become 
conscious.” (1984 74) Obviously, neither the Party nor Winston Smith 
concedes intellectual capacity to the proles, which means that they concede 
no positive liberty to them, i.e. no inner freedom to recognise their strength 
and take action. “They can be granted intellectual liberty because they have 
no intellect.” (1984 219) What becomes evident here is a case in which 
negative and positive liberty do not correlate with each other. The proles 
actually do have a large degree of negative freedom, yet, they seem not able 
to take advantage of the opportunities, because they are not in control of 
their lives due to inner obstacles such as lack of intellectual capacity.  
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4. The Manifestations of Positive Liberty in 1984 
 
 
4.1. A perverted Notion of Liberty in 1984  
 
Isaiah Berlin calls our attention to the dangers of a perverted notion of 
positive liberty by pointing out that especially totalitarian regimes have 
politically twisted this concept of liberty into its opposite. Let us bear in mind 
that the positive notion of liberty implies a high and a low nature of the self 
and that the high and hence real self is often conceived as wider than the 
individual and identified with a social whole, for instance a political party. This 
collective entity then tries to impose its collective will upon the individual in 
order to achieve its own and, in this way, the individual‟s „higher‟ freedom. 
Moreover, the collective whole arrogates to itself to know better what serves 
the development of the higher nature of the individual and presumes the right 
to coerce the individual in the name of his or her true self and therefore his or 
her freedom.  This is exactly what happens in Orwell‟s novel, with the 
addition that in 1984 the Party openly propagates that “Freedom is Slavery” 
(1984 6).  
 
Fitting into the concept of a perverted notion of liberty, the Ingsoc regime 
does not simply want to impose its will upon its citizens, moreover, it wants 
them to believe that the will of the party is identical with their own will. As a 
consequence, the Party exerts various highly elaborated manipulation tactics 
to achieve not only “complete obedience to the will of the State, but complete 
uniformity of opinion” (1984 214).  In the Ministry of Love, O‟Brian reveals to 
Smith what the Party expects from its members: 
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 We are not content with negative obedience, nor even with the most 
 abject submission. […] The command of the old despotism was 
 “Thou shalt not”. The command of the totalitarians was “Thou 
 shalt”. Our command is “Thou art”. (1984 267) 
 
 
 
4.2. The Principles of Doublethink 
 
“For, it is only by reconciling contradictions that power can be retained 
indefinitely.” (1984 225)  In 1984 an enormously effective means of retaining 
power by exercising reality control over individuals is represented by the 
practice of doublethink. Doublethink is the “simultaneous belief in two 
contradictory ideas” (Merriam-Webster) or “the power to hold two completely 
contradictory beliefs in one's mind simultaneously, and accept both of them.” 
(Abraham par.22) At first appearance, it seems difficult to grasp the idea of 
doublethink, for as rational beings we consider it rather illogical and absurd to 
perform such an act of mental self-deception. Intrinsically, it is hard to 
imagine how doublethink works. Smith describes it this way:  
To know and not to know, to be conscious of complete truthfulness 
 while telling carefully-constructed lies, to hold simultaneously two 
 opinions which cancelled out , knowing them to be contradictory  and 
believing in both of them; to use logic against logic, to repudiate 
 morality while laying claim to it, to believe that democracy was 
 impossible and that the Party was the guardian of democracy; to 
 forget whatever it was necessary to forget, then to draw it back into 
 memory again at the moment when it was needed, and then 
 promptly to forget it again: and above all, to apply the same process 
 to the process itself. That was the ultimate subtlety: consciously to 
 induce unconsciousness, and then, once again, to become 
 unconscious of the act of hypnosis you had just performed. Even to 
 understand the world „doublethink‟ involved the use of doublethink. 
 (1984 37-38) 
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However, it has been argued that the concept as such is not a new one. “It 
was used in biblical times when believers were advised. „Let not thy left hand 
know what thy right hand doeth,‟” (Ingle 131). The mental process of 
doublethink represents in so far a means of reality control as, applied by the 
individual, it prevents autonomous rational thinking and as a result it creates 
a mind that is prone to all kind of outer and self- manipulation. In fact, in 
doublethink the Party has found a mighty instrument to reduce positive liberty 
by limiting the range of thought and hence the freedom to think and act 
autonomously and rationally. Referring to Berlin‟s theory about positive 
liberty, doublethink can be identified as an inner obstacle that obstructs the 
evolvement of a higher nature of the self, i.e. the true self, which is 
autonomous and guided by reason. It is exactly by producing this system of 
thought in which contradictions can exist simultaneously that the Party has 
established a stable and permanent form of dominion: “If one is to rule, and 
to continue ruling, one must be able to dislocate the sense of reality.” (1984 
224)  
 
The technique of doublethink is so deeply rooted in the principles of Ingsoc 
that it is even engraved in the Party‟s main slogans: War is Peace. Freedom 
is slavery. Ignorance is strength. Also the names of the four ministries exhibit 
the Party‟s deliberate reversal of the facts. “The Ministry of Peace concerns 
itself with war, the Minsitry of Truth with lies, the Ministry of Love with torture 
and the Ministry of Plenty with starvation.” (1984 225) In order to exemplify 
what effect the practice of doublethink has on Oceania‟s everyday life, we 
should take a closer look at the public speech during the Hate Week when it 
all of a sudden becomes known that Oceania was at war with Eastasia and 
not Eurasia, and always has been. The abrupt change of the enemy happens 
during the speech with the orator switching “from one line to the other 
actually in mid-sentence, not only without a pause, but without even breaking 
the syntax” (1984 189). 
Without words said, a wave of understanding rippled through the 
 crowd. Oceania was at war with Eastasia. The next moment there 
 was a tremendous commotion. The banners and posters with which 
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 the square was decorated were all wrong! Quite half of them had  the 
wrong faces on them. It was sabotage! The agents of Goldstein had 
been at work! There was a riotous interlude while posters were 
 ripped from the walls, banners torn the shreds and trampled 
 underfoot. The Spies performed prodigies of activity in clambering 
 over the rooftops and cutting the streamers that fluttered from the 
 chimneys. But within two or three minutes it was all over. The 
 orator, still gripping the neck of the microphone, his shoulders 
 hunched forward, his free hand clawing at the air, had gone straight 
 on with his speech. One minute more, and the feral roars of rage 
 were again bursting from the crowd. The Hate continued exactly as 
 before, except that the target had been changed. (1984 188) 
 
As it becomes evident in this scene, the citizens of Oceania perform 
consciously and unconsciously at the same moment the act of (self-) 
deception leaving all rationality and logic aside and accepting the sudden 
change as an unquestionable matter-of-fact.  
 
Winston Smith contemplates on the intellectual capacity, i.e. the positive 
liberty, of his comrades and detects that the doctrine of the Party is most 
successfully imposed “on people incapable of understanding it” (1984 163). 
Thus, people whose positive liberty is restricted, by low intelligence on the 
one hand, and through the appliance of doublethink, on the other hand, can 
be made to “accept the most flagrant violations of reality, because they never 
fully grasped the enormity of what was demanded of them” (1984 163). Smith 
adds: “By lack of understanding they remained sane.” (1984 163) 
 
Insane, however, according to Smith, is the intelligentsia, i.e. the higher class 
or the Inner Party. Smith states that the most refined practitioners of 
doublethink are those who invented this system of thought and “know that it 
is a vast system of mental cheating” (1984 224). It appears confounding, yet 
Smith insists that: 
 In our society, those who have the best knowledge of what is 
 happening are also those who are furthest from seeing the world as 
 it is. In general, the greater the understanding, the greater the 
 delusion: the more intelligent, the less sane. (1984 224)  
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It appears rather contradictory that the intellectuals should deliberately limit 
their own amount of positive liberty by deluding themselves with doublethink; 
however, we must consider the fact that the intellectuals in 1984 are mainly 
interested in power. It should be noted that a power-crazed mind represents 
a vast inner obstacle to the development of a higher nature in Berlin‟s sense 
and that it has the ability to make the most intelligent man a lunatic slave of 
his own desire for power – a desire which often obscures the sense of reality.  
  
 
 
4.3.Thoughtcrime  
 
The political system of Ingsoc, which demands complete uniformity of its 
subjects, does not tolerate “even the smallest deviation of opinion on the 
most unimportant subject” (1984 219). For, it is not only the subversive action 
that counts as a crime; it is already the heretic thought that is regarded as the 
worst crime possible, the so called thoughtcrime. O‟Brian makes clear: “We 
are not interested in those stupid crimes that you have committed. The Party 
is not interested in the overt act: the thought is all we care about.” (1984 265) 
It is, therefore, utterly dangerous to have your own attitudes in Oceania, 
especially if these are non-compliant to the state‟s policy. In relation to 
Berlin‟s theory, it can be said that in 1984 it is dangerous to possess a certain 
amount of positive freedom, i.e. to think autonomously and to be the 
instrument of one‟ own acts of will.  
 
The Party systematically narrows down the area of positive liberty of its 
citizens in order to destroy potential independent ideas which would question 
the hegemony of the Party. For instance, next to doublethink, the Party has 
taught its members to apply the method of crimestop whenever a dissident 
thought should occur: 
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 Crimestop means the faculty of stopping short, as though by 
 instinct, at the threshold of any dangerous thought. It includes the 
 power of not grasping analogies, of failing to perceive logical errors, 
 of misunderstanding the simplest arguments if they are inimical to 
 Ingsoc, and of being bored or repelled by any train of thought which 
 is capable of leading in a heretical direction. Crimestop, in short, 
 means protective stupidity. (1984 220/221) 
 
Psychologically speaking, crimestop can be regarded as a self-defence 
mechanism that repels „undesirable‟ thoughts and impulses keeping them 
unconscious. As such it represents an inner obstruction of positive liberty.  
 
People whose ideas in the first place conform to the principles of the Party 
due to their freedom of thought being restricted could be compared with 
Berlin‟s paradox of the contented slave. Orwell depicts the majority of 
Oceania‟s population as perfectly satisfied with Big Brother and his regime 
and content with the living conditions. Does this imply that, since they are 
seemingly content with their lives and approve of the Party, they are free in a 
positive sense of the word? In order to answer this question, let us bear in 
mind that the desires and thoughts of an individual should be autonomously 
developed by the subject him/herself, if he or she is to be called positively 
free. If one‟s ideas are imposed upon oneself through manipulation and 
indoctrination, we cannot speak of freedom. If these thoughts were 
developed rationally and autonomously by independently thinking subjects, 
who are aware of other options, they could be rightly called free.  
 
Committing thoughtcrime, then, can be associated with an inner struggle for 
liberty. It can be seen as a sign of an independent mind trying to escape the 
clutches of the Party‟s indoctrination. Thus, it is not surprising that the regime 
persecutes and takes ruthless action against dissidents. “Thoughtcrime does 
not entail death: thoughtcrime IS death,” (1984 30) writes Smith in his secret 
diary pointing to the fact that sooner or later the Thought Police will inevitably 
catch him and finally kill him. As a matter of fact, the Thought Police has 
established a vast control system to detect thougthcriminals, so that, be it 
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due to constant surveillance or due to denunciation by one of the Spies or a 
comrade, no dissident ever escapes unnoticed and unscathed. 
  
Thoughtcriminals once captured by the police, are transferred to the Ministry 
of Love, where after a long period of torture they have to confess to all their 
alleged crimes, before finally their will is completely broken and they 
surrender to Big Brother and his doctrine. Only after being mentally defeated 
by the Party, they are executed and erased from the records - They become 
unpersons.  O‟Brian comments on the Party‟s claim to mental capitulation of 
its dissidents in this way: 
When finally you surrender to us, it must be of your own free will. We do 
not destroy the heretic because he resists to us: so long as he resists 
us we never destroy him. We convert him, we capture his inner mind, 
we reshape him. We burn all evil and all illusion out  of him; we bring 
him over to our side, not in appearance, but genuinely, heart and soul. 
We make him one of ourselves before we kill him. It is intolerable to us 
that an erroneous thought should  exist anywhere in the world, however 
secret and powerless it may be. Even in the instant of death we cannot 
permit any deviations. In the old days the heretic walked to the stake 
still a heretic, proclaiming his heresy, exulting in it. Even the victim of 
the Russian purges could carry rebellion locked up in his skull as he 
walked  down the passage waiting for the bullet. But we make the brain 
perfect before we blow it out. (1984 267)  
 
 
 42 
 
4.4. Are Winston and Julia Positively Free? 
 
Winston Smith despises the mystique of the Party and the worship of Big 
Brother. He frantically tries to recollect a time, when he was a young child, 
hoping to find some solace in the past, when things were different. At least, 
he hopes that things were different, for he cannot exactly remember and 
since the historic facts have been falsified by the Ministry of Truth – an 
institution where he himself is involved in the process of altering the facts – 
there is little undeniable evidence he could refer to in order to affirm his 
theories about the dishonesty of the Party. Although he knows about it, he 
cannot prove anything: 
How could you tell how much of it was lies? It might be true that the 
average human being was better off now than he had been before  the 
Revolution. The only evidence to the contrary was the mute  process in 
your own bones, the instinctive feeling that the  conditions you lived in 
were intolerable and that at some other time they must have been 
different. (1984 76)  
 
It becomes clear that Smith has somehow managed to stay resistant to the 
Party‟s indoctrination and manipulation. He seems immune to propaganda, 
he does not apply the method of doublethink, he disapproves of the Party‟s 
sexual morality and he certainly does not refrain from non-conformist ideas. 
Indisputably, Smith represents a thoughtcriminal. Viewed in this light, he 
seems to have retained his positive liberty by being able to conceive his own 
opinions and to act according to his own free will. Smith is indeed quite 
intelligent and capable of grasping logical coherences and figuring out 
manipulation techniques. However, he seems intellectually inferior to the 
members of the Inner Party, for he cannot comprehend the ultimate aim of 
the Party‟s policy, which is, according to O‟Brian, “solely power” (1984 275). 
“I understand HOW: I do not understand WHY,” writes Smith in his diary 
(1984 83). Furthermore, he feels despairingly alone, “a minority of one”, 
(1984 83) not knowing whether he is a lunatic, or the last human left in the 
world. For this reason, he seeks and longs for like-minded people believing 
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that O‟Brian might be a secret opponent of the regime as well. In Julia he 
finds a kindred spirit and so, winged by the hope for resistance and a 
possible shift of paradigm one day in the future, they both light-headedly and 
unwarily walk right into O‟Brian‟s trap.  
 
Julia, compared against Winston, knows much better how to survive in the 
system.  Although she despises the constricting rules of the regime as well, 
she is able to successfully disguise her true nature by simulating a 
commendable devotee of Big Brother and the Party. Unlike Winston, Julia, 
however, does not appear very interested in a general discussion about 
political ideology; she does not seem capable of a meta level analysis of the 
“ramifications of Party doctrine” (see 1984 163); instead she is only 
interested in the area of her own private liberty to do whatever she feels like 
doing, for instance making love with whomever she wants to. This fact has 
brought her Winston‟s critique to be “only a rebel from the waist downwards” 
(1984 163). 
 
Relating to the theory of positive liberty, one could argue that Julia definitely 
possesses a certain degree of positive freedom due to the fact that she 
opposes to the Party doctrine and follows her own, individually and rationally 
developed desires and ideas about her own life. However, is it justified to say 
that her amount of positive liberty might be of a lower nature since her ideas 
and actions centre mainly on lower passions and impulses? Employing 
traditional and obsolete gender roles on his characters (the male being more 
intellectual, the female more sensual) Orwell clearly depicts Julia as 
intellectually inferior to Winston. Further, she apparently betrays Winston in 
the Ministry of Love much earlier than he betrays her, which should also point 
to her lower, less idealistic nature. From a feminist point of view, Orwell might 
cause frowns and arouse criticism in this point.  
 
However, Stephen Ingle‟s argumentation throws a different light on Julia‟s 
autonomy: 
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It is clear that it was love for Winston and not any desire to overthrow 
the regime that drove her to join the brotherhood. Julia was concerned 
only with little victories, with defeating the Party  every time she 
made love, drank real coffee or used make-up. Julia, not Winston, was 
concerned with pursuing her own „free and unfettered volition‟. […] 
Winston had noted earlier of her that „the standards she obeyed were 
private ones. Her feelings were her own, and could not be altered from 
outside‟. And ultimately, Winston dismissed her as a rebel only from 
waist downwards. Winston Smith was not the last truly autonomous 
individual in Europe: Julia was. (Ingle 127) 
 
Referring to Winston‟s autonomy, Ingle points out: 
Far from a searcher for the truth, a bloodied champion of the 
 individual as an autonomous moral agent, Winston Smith turned out 
 to have been a closet collectivist, and indeed a potential terrorist. 
 Can we seriously consider a man who was prepared, even anxious, 
 to undertake savage acts which, of their nature, would necessarily 
 deprive many unknown individuals of their own truths, indeed of 
 their own lives, to be a talisman for individual moral autonomy? 
 Winston Smith was just as willing as Rousseau to force people to be 
free. (Ingle 136) 
 
Both, Julia and Winston, believe that, once arrested, they will mange to 
maintain their positive liberty and to stay human by not betraying their own 
feelings. “They can‟t get inside you” (1984 174) is what they hope:  
They could not alter your feelings: for that matter you could not alter 
 them yourself, even if you wanted to. They could lay bare in the 
 utmost detail everything that you had done or said or thought; but  the 
inner heart, whose workings were mysterious even to yourself, 
 remained impregnable. (1984 174)  
 
Ultimately, “to die hating them, that was freedom” (1984 294) signifies 
Winston‟s belief in his own and in human‟s (positive) liberty in general. 
However, letting the Party power triumph over individual idealism, Orwell 
leaves us completely disillusioned by ending the novel with his protagonist 
being converted and his will broken: “He had won the victory over himself. He 
loved Big Brother.” (1984 311)  
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5. The Manifestations of Negative Liberty in A Clockwork 
Orange 
 
 
5.1. “As Queer as a Clockwork Orange” 
 
The artist Anthony Burgess was somewhat unhappy that of the fifty and more 
works which he published during his lifetime, A Clockwork Orange was the 
most famous one. He believed he had written far better books and feared he 
would be remembered “as the fountain and origin of a great film”, i.e. the 
celebrated Stanley Kubrick‟s adaption of the novel. “He compared himself to 
Rachmaninoff, whose Prelude in C Sharp Minor, written as a boy, is better 
known than the works of his maturity.” (Clockwork vii) But it is A Clockwork 
Orange, one of his first works published in 1962, which the readers first 
associate with the name Anthony Burgess (see Clockwork vii). And indeed, it 
is a very special novel. To begin with the title, which is a colloquial cockney 
expression the writer once heard on the underground: “as queer as a 
clockwork orange” meaning very queer indeed. “I had always liked the 
cockney expression and felt there might be a meaning in it deeper than a 
bizarre metaphor of, not necessarily sexual, queerness.” Burgess said. (qtd. 
in Wenzl 38) Then there is the strictly symmetric tripartite structure of the 
novel, the vision of a near-future society, the description of a youth-culture in 
revolt, a corrupt police force and a helpless government. Furthermore, there 
is the queer, exotic language of A Clockwork Orange, and finally its moral 
dilemma concerning the freedom and autonomy of men (see Clockwork vii).  
All these factors make the novel an outstanding and unique work of art.  
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5.2. Alex and his Droogs 
 
Unlike Winston Smith in George Orwell‟s 1984, Alex, the protagonist of A 
Clockwork Orange does not appear to suffer from serious and unjustified 
limitations of his negative liberty on behalf of the government at the beginning 
of his narrative. On the contrary, the officials seem quite helpless against 
youth gangs and their hooligan behaviour which spreads terror among the 
civil population. As Alex explains: “You never really saw many of the older 
bourgeois type after nightfall those days, what with the shortage of police and 
we fine young malchckiwicks3 about.” (Clockwork 6) The boys, trying to 
escape the dreariness of the working class society they live in, seek pleasure 
in exaggerated acts of violence. Remarkable as an indicator for the stifling 
tediousness and the repetitive monotony of everyday life is the phrase 
“What‟s it going to be then, eh?” with which each new episode of Alex‟s 
goings-on is initiated. Indeed, this prospect of a monotonous life as led by 
Alex‟s parents appears the only objective the young of that society rebel 
against, since they are not bothered about politics and politics in general 
does not necessarily interfere in their lives. Compared with the situation in 
Orwell‟s 1984 political oppression does not, at least at the beginning of the 
novel, play a significant role. Thus, the community depicted by Burgess can 
be said to feature a reasonable degree of negative liberty. Yet the juveniles, 
especially Alex and his droogs4 are not content with the confines of liberty 
that are due to them and want more. This extra range of freedom they 
demand inevitably violates the Harm Principle as outlined by John Stuart Mill 
which purports that the only purpose for which liberty may be restricted and 
power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community 
is to prevent harm to others.5 Put another way, the principle is also realised in 
the old aphorism “My freedom ends where yours begins”. Alex and his 
contemporaries, however, seek to violate the liberty and security of other 
people seemingly just for the fun of it.  
                                                          
3
 Nadsat: boys. 
4
 Nadsat: friends. 
5
 see Chapter 2. 
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Already at the very beginning of the novel the evil intentions of the first-
person narrator, Alex, are expressed in a programmatic way. Alex and his 
droogs are sitting in the Korova Milkbar, bored, hoping for some excitement:  
Our pockets were full of deng6, so there was no real need from the 
 point of view of crasting any more pretty polly7 to tolchock8 some old 
 veck9 in an alley and viddy10 him swim in his blood while we counted 
 the takings and divided by four, nor to do the ultra-violent on some 
 shivering starry11 grey-haired ptitsa12 in a shop and go smecking13 off 
 with the till‟s guts. (Clockwork 3) 
 
So the boys have collected enough money, i.e. robbed it from defenceless 
people, like they always do, however, their hunger for turmoil is not slaked 
yet, as it scarcely ever is. To escape the boredom, Alex and his three droogs 
have, as usual, taken drugs, which can also be regarded as a way of 
expanding one‟s freedom and transgressing the limitations of one‟s negative 
liberty, if we consider the fact that drugs are prohibited by the law. Yet, in the 
England of A Clockwork Orange the boys take some new, apparently 
synthetic drugs that are not prohibited yet. The illustration of designer 
narcotics called vellocet, synthemesc or drencrom is only one of Burgess‟s 
many prophetic inventions in the novel. Indeed, the description of the state of 
intoxication resembles the effects of psychedelic drugs such as LSD, which 
reached high popularity in the late 1960ies and 1970ies: 
He was in the land all right, well away, in orbit, and I knew what it was 
like, having tried it like everybody else had done, but at this time I‟d got 
to thinking it was a cowardly sort of a veshch14, O my brothers. You‟d 
lay there after you‟d drunk the old moloko15 and then you got the 
messel16 that everything all round you was sort of in the past. You could 
viddy it all right, all of it, very clear – tables, the stereo, the lights, the 
sharps and the malchicks17 – but it was like some veshch that used to 
                                                          
6
 Nadsat: money.  
7
 Nadsat: money. 
8
 Nadsat: to hit. 
9
 Nadsat: guy. 
10
 Nadsat: to see. 
11
 Nadsat: old. 
12
 Nadsat: girl/ bird. 
13
 Nadsat: to laugh. 
14
 Nadsat: thing. 
15
 Nadsat: milk. 
16
 Nadsat: thought. 
17
 Nadsat: boy. 
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be there but was not there not no more. And you were sort of 
hypnotized by your  boot or shoe or a finger-nail as it might be, and at 
the same time you  were sort of picked up by the old scruff and shook 
like you might be a cat. You got shook and shook till there was nothing 
left. You lost your name and your body and your self and you just didn‟t 
care, and you waited till your boot or your finger-nail got yellow, then 
yellower and  yellower all the time. Then the lights started cracking light 
atomics and  the boot or finger-nail or, as it might be, a bit of dirt on 
your trouser-bottom turned into a big big big mesto18, bigger than the 
whole world, and you were just going to get introduced to old Bog or 
God when it was all over. You came back to here and now whimpering 
sort of, with your rot all squaring up for a boohoohoo. (Clockwork 5) 
 
What follows is a spate of violent scenarios deliberately initiated by the four 
boys, starting off with the bloody bludgeoning of an elderly bourgeois 
gentleman with some heavy books under his arm in front of a library. The 
gang catches him up and starts to provoke and humiliate him. They rip up the 
pages of the books and being accused of vandalism by the old man, they 
viciously beat him up: 
„You naughty old veck, you!‟ I said, and then we begun to filly about with 
him. Pete held his rookers19 and Georgie sort of hooked his rot20 wide 
open for him and Dim yanked out his false zoobies21, upper and lower. 
He threw these down on the pavement and then I treated them to the 
old booth-crush, though they were hard bastards like, being made of 
some new horrorshow plastic stuff. The old veck began to make sort of 
chumbling22 shooms23 – „wuf waf wof‟ – so Georgie let go of holding his 
goobers24 apart and just let him have one in the toothless rot with his 
ringy fist, and that made the old veck start moaning a lot then, then 
comes the blood, my brothers, real beautiful. (Clockwork 7)  
 
In contrast to the conditions in 1984, the heroes – i.e. anti-heroes - of A 
Clockwork Orange are not the victims of oppression, but they are the 
oppressors themselves. Not their civil rights are violated, but they infringe the 
rights of others by disentitling them, for instance, of the right to physical 
integrity and property. As an example, they assault a homeless drunkard, 
                                                          
18
 Nadsat: place. 
19
 Nadsat: arms/ hands. 
20
 Nadsat: mouth. 
21
 Nadsat: teeth. 
22
 Nadsat: mumbling. 
23
 Nadsat: noises. 
24
 Nadsat: lips. 
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who, being unable to protect himself, expresses his sorrow for a “stinking 
world like this one” complaining that it “lets the young get on to the old” and 
that “there‟s no law nor order no more” (Clockwork 12).  
The ultimate act of violence, however, is performed on a married couple into 
whose home the gang manages to enter by a tricky deception. It is the home 
of an author who is writing on a book called A Clockwork Orange – “a fair 
gloopy25 title” Alex remarks. “Who ever heard of a clockwork orange?” 
(Clockwork 18) The work is obviously a piece of political writing advocating 
liberalism and demanding less regimentation: 
The attempt to impose upon a man, a creature of growth and capable 
 of sweetness, to ooze juicily at the last round the bearded lips of God, 
 to attempt to impose, I say, laws and conditions appropriate to a 
 mechanical creation, against this I raise my sword-pen. (Clockwork 18)  
 
As we later get to know, the name of the author is F. Alexander, an 
intellectual and writer of subversive literature; and given the fact that he 
strongly opposes the so-called Ludovico‟s technique - the treatment Alex 
naively consents to undergo - the quoted passage above may represent an 
extract of a manifesto against the said technique. On any account, the 
passage implies a position against laws and regimentation which would make 
humans, hence creatures capable of growth and willing to learn, a 
mechanical creation, a clockwork, and so minimise their liberty. To impose 
laws and certain conditions upon humans is always a matter of outer 
interference, and as such it belongs to the field of negative liberty.   
 
It appears ironic that of all people the subversive writer himself becomes the 
victim of youth delinquency and turns into a vindictive man longing to take the 
law into his own hands and punish Alex for his misdemeanour. Yet, the 
gravity of Alex‟s and his friends‟ trespasses in relation to the author and his 
wife cannot be denied. For, what happens in the home of the couple is sheer 
horror and blatantly evil and obscene: The boys rape the author‟s wife in front 
of his eyes: 
                                                          
25
 Nadsat: stupid. 
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So he did the strong-man on the devotchka26, who was still creech 
creech creeching27 away in very horroshow four-in-a-bar, locking her 
rookers from the back, while I ripped away at this and that and the 
other, the others going haw haw haw still, and real good horrorshow 
groodies28 they were that then exhibited their pink glazzies29, O my 
brothers, while I untrussed and got ready for the plunge. Plunging, I 
could slooshy30 cries of agony and this writer bleeding veck that 
Georgie and Pete held on to nearly got loose howling bezoomny31 with 
the filthiest of slovos32 that I already knew and others he was making 
up. Then after me it was right old Dim should have his turn, which he 
did in a beasty snorty howly sort of a way with his Peebee Shelley 
maskie taking no notice, while I held on to her. Then there was a 
changeover, Dim and me grabbing the slobbering writer veck who was 
past struggling really, only just coming out with slack of sort of slovos 
like he was in the land in a milk-plus bar, and Pete and Georgie had 
theirs. Then there was like quite and we were full of like hate, so 
smashed what was left to be smashed – typewriter, lamp, chairs – and 
Dim, it was typical of old Dim, watered the fire out and was going to 
dung on the carpet, there being plenty of paper, but I said no. „Out out 
out out,‟ I howled. The writer veck and his zheena33 were not really 
there, bloody and torn and making noises. But they‟d live. (Clockwork 
20)  
  
What we have here is an autobiographical reference: Burgess‟s first wife was 
beaten and robbed in London by a gang of four GI deserters. As a 
consequence, she suffered a miscarriage. The writer conjectured that her 
poor health and early death may be connected to the attack (see Clockwork 
xiv). 
The fictionalizing of this episode in A Clockwork Orange was a catharsis 
for Burgess, and, as he once said, „an act of charity‟ to his wife‟s 
assailants, since he chooses to write it as if from their point of view 
rather than their victim‟s. (Clockwork xiv) 
 
Taking all the obscenities into account, the situation in the streets of 
Burgess‟s dystopian London with its gang fights, robberies, rapes and 
deliberate vandalism is reminiscent of what the Social Contract philosopher 
                                                          
26
 Nadsat: girl. 
27
 Nadsat: to scream. 
28
 Nadsat: breast. 
29
 Nadsat: eyes / nipples. 
30
 Nadsat: to hear. 
31
 Nadsat: mad. 
32
 Nadsat: words. 
33
 Nadsat: wife. 
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Thomas Hobbes calls the state of nature. As has been outlined in chapter 2, 
such a state is realised in a condition without government, that is, in a state 
with maximum negative liberty, where each individual decides for himself/ 
herself how to act there being no laws or restrictions of any kind. In this state 
of mere nature the individual is judge, jury and executioner in his or her own 
case whenever a dispute arises because there are no agencies or authorities 
to arbitrate disputes and exercise power to enforce decisions (see Lloyd 
ch.3). As a matter of course, there is a government in A Clockwork Orange; 
however, it is initially too lax and unable to control the situation.  
 
Alex and his friends, as well as other boy gangs, who have managed to 
create their own state of nature, act like the people described by Hobbes. 
For, the philosopher draws a very pessimistic image of humanity assuming 
that people are greedy and egoistic and although they have local affections, 
their benevolence is limited and they are prone to partiality. In the state of 
nature everybody has a natural right to preserve oneself and undertake 
whatever one considers needful for one‟s preservation. However, there are 
no limits as to what one might judge necessary for one‟s preservation and the 
theoretically circumscribed right of nature becomes practically an unlimited 
right to anything, or, in Hobbes‟s words, a right “to all things” (see Lloyd 
ch.3). If we follow Hobbes‟s contemplations, it becomes replicable that such 
a right of each to all things invites unavoidable conflict and clash of interests. 
Mind that humans, according to the philosopher, are greedy and interested in 
their own benefit; specifically when there is competition for resources, as 
there always will certainly be, especially over goods such as the most 
desirable lands, materials, food, spouses, etc. In expectance and fear that 
others may invade them, people may plan to strike first following the „Offence 
is the best defence‟ principle. Moreover, persons tending to be proud or 
naturally dominant and to enjoy exercising power over others will try to 
impose their dominance over their fellow men. There will be, furthermore, 
dispute over moral and religious questions and since everybody is free to 
decide what is right and what wrong for him/ her but also to enforce his/ her 
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views on other people, and there being no authority to resolve the conflicts, 
the situation is doomed to escalate into a state of war (see Lloyd ch.4).  
 
A state of war is exactly what we have in A Clockwork Orange, for, it is a war 
in the streets between delinquent youth gangs who do not accept any moral 
values or laws, who do not respect any authority except for their own 
maxims, and who spread fear and terror among innocent people. Alex and 
his friends seem, at the beginning of the narrative, inherently evil; they make 
an extensive use of the „natural right to all things‟, and create a situation in 
which a perverted notion of negative liberty becomes evident, namely a state 
of pure chaos and anarchy.  
 
 
 
5.3. How the “Ludovico’s Technique” Affects Negative Liberty 
 
Deceived and decoyed into a trap by his droogs who do not want him as their 
leader anymore, the young boy fails during an attack on an older woman and 
is finally imprisoned for murder. His imprisonment marks a turning point in the 
narrative, as this is the first time that his criminal behaviour is followed by 
serious punishment and the liberty he had claimed for himself is suddenly 
constrained. Nevertheless, Alex, although only fifteen years old, seems to 
master the new circumstances quite well: He is still able to enjoy both his 
beloved classical music and violence. Regularly helping the prison charlie34, 
a good-hearted priest with a drinking problem, with the musical selection for 
the Sunday mass, Alex manages to keep in constant touch with his passion 
for music. Also, he finds extreme pleasure in reading the violent parts of the 
bible that would send him into rapture: 
 
                                                          
34
 Nadsat: chaplain. 
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They would like lock me in and let me slooshy35 holy music by J.S. 
Bach and G.F. Handel, and I would read of all these starry yahoodies36 
tolchocking37 each other and then peeting38 their Hebrew vino and 
getting on to the bed with their wives‟ like hand-maidens, real 
horrorshow. That kept me going, brothers. (Clockwork 60)  
 
Moreover, listening to the music of Bach, he even imagines helping in and 
taking charge of the nailing in of Jesus, “being dressed in a like toga that was 
the height of Roman fashion” (Clockwork 60). On the whole, Alex considers 
his time in prison “not all that wasted” (Clockwork 60) until he overhears the 
news about a new treatment “that gets you out of prison in no time at all and 
makes sure that you never get back in again” (Clockwork 62).  
 
The treatment the young protagonist has heard of is the so called Ludovico‟s 
technique, a psychological aversion therapy, still at an experimental stage, 
which would, as the inventors and the advocates of the method say, cure the 
criminals by eliminating the criminal instinct:  
Common criminals like this unsavoury crowd […] can best be dealt 
with on a purely curative basis. Kill the criminal reflex, that‟ all. Full 
 implementation in a year‟s time. Punishment means nothing to them, 
 you can see that. They enjoy their so-called punishment. They start 
 murdering each other. (Clockwork 69)  
 
Alex, infatuated with the idea of an early release and not knowing what the 
treatment really entails, determines to volunteer for the experiment despite 
the scepticism and the premonitions of the prison charlie. So he ends up 
being the guinea pig for Dr. Brodsky and his team of scientists. These force 
Alex, after they have injected him with drugs, to watch extremely violent 
images for a long period of time without being able to close his eyes or 
interrupt the treatment. Bound to a chair in front of a gigantic silver screen, 
Alex has to watch short films and scenes of horrible rapes, murder, homicide, 
bloody fights, etc. What the teenager then goes through is a near death 
                                                          
35
 Nadsat: to listen. 
36
 Nadsat: Jews. 
37 
Nadsat: to hit. 
38
 Nadsat: to drink. 
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experience, suffering under extreme forms of disgust and nausea as an 
effect of the drugs the doctors have injected him.  
 
The idea behind the treatment is quite simple and goes back to early 
psychological experiments as carried out by the behaviourists Ivan Pavlov 
and B.F. Skinner. Thus, the Ludovico‟s technique is a variation of the 
classical conditioning procedure, which is a form of associative learning, i.e. 
“a type of learning principle based on the assumption that ideas and 
experiences reinforce one another and can be linked to enhance the learning 
process.” (The Free Dictionary) In Alex‟s case the simultaneous experience 
of images of violence and the nausea caused by the medicaments lead to the 
assimilation of the sensations with the result that violence is associated with 
illness and each time he should attempt to perform or even just witness 
violence, he will feel terribly ill and nauseated.  
„Now, then,‟ said Dr Brodsky, „how do you think this is done? Tell me, 
what do you think we‟re doing to you?‟ 
„You‟re making me feel ill, I‟m ill when I look at those filthy pervert films 
of yours. But it‟s not really the films that‟s doing it. But I feel that if you 
stop these films I‟ll stop feeling ill.‟ 
„Right,‟ said Dr Brodsky. „it‟s association, the oldest educational method 
in the world. And what really causes you to feel ill?‟ 
„These grahzny39 sodding40 veshches that come out of my gulliver and 
my plott41,‟ I said, „that‟s what it is.‟ 
[…] 
„Well,‟ he said to me, „it isn‟t the wires. It‟s nothing to do with what‟s 
fastened to you. Those are just for measuring your reactions. What is it, 
then?‟ 
I viddied then, of course, what a bezoomny shoot I was not to notice 
that it was the hypodermic shots in the rooker. (Clockwork 86) 
 
 
Soon Alex notices that it was a big mistake to assent to the treatment, 
especially during the presentation of a Nazi film as he bitterly has to realise 
that the hideous images are accompanied by the pompous music of 
Beethoven, with the consequence that from then on he will not be able to 
listen to his favourite music without associating violence with it and thus feel 
                                                          
39
 Nadsat: dirty. 
40
 Nadsat: fucking (idiom.).  
41
 Nadsat: flesh. 
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terrible pain and sickness. “It‟s a sin, that‟s what it is, a filthy unforgivable sin, 
you bratchnies42,” Alex exclaims, “Using Ludwig van like that. He did no harm 
to anyone. Beethoven just wrote music” (Clockwork 85). “Each man kills the 
thing he loves,” Dr Branom responds. “Here‟s the punishment element, 
perhaps.” (Clockwork 85) It should be noted that Burgess has obviously 
chosen the name Ludovico (Italian form of Ludwig) for the technique for ironic 
purposes. 
 
In terms of the aspects of negative liberty it is exactly the punishment factor 
that should be taken into account. As a matter of fact, a new government has 
come into power during Alex‟s imprisonment, a more stringent government 
which has dedicated itself to a more consistent prosecution of criminals and a 
more effective form of punishment. The Minister of the Interior‟s remark 
“Soon we may be needing all our prison space for political offenders,” 
(Clockwork 69) implies that the situation under the new regime is going to be 
anything but lax and that the liberal area of the former government has 
definitely come to an end. The implementation of the Ludovico‟s technique 
thus perfectly fits into the new State policy since it represents a means of 
maintaining control and exercising perfect power over the citizens. As far as 
the aspect of punishment is concerned, the Governor is first not able to grasp 
the magnitude of such a treatment: 
Well, these new ridiculous ideas have come at last and orders are 
orders, though I may say to you in confidence that I do not approve. I 
most emphatically do not approve. An eye for an eye, I say. If someone 
hits you you hit back, do you not? Why then should not the State, very 
severely hit by you brutal hooligans, not hit back also? But the new view 
is to say no. The new view is that we turn the bad into the good. All of 
which seems to me grossly unjust. (Clockwork 70) 
 
Yet, what the Governor fails to recognise is that there is possibly no greater 
punishment than to bereave somebody of his/ her free choice. The treatment 
narrows down the number of options how to act and react by allowing only 
one possible kind of behaviour, namely the kind the government regards as 
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desirable. After the treatment, Alex is no longer in charge of his actions. He 
cannot choose the direction of his behaviour since the only option he has is 
to behave according to the conditioning. All other options are eliminated. As 
such, the treatment represents a massive form of outer interference and 
limitation of one‟s liberty. In this regard, the technique can be seen as a very 
powerful instrument which is open to politically motivated abuse. Although 
Alex has volunteered for the treatment, he was not sufficiently informed about 
its implications. It should be reckoned that he represents a test subject who 
takes part in a psychological experiment. After the technique has proved to 
be successful, it appears rather doubtful that the future captives will have the 
right to decide if they want to undergo the treatment or rather stay in prison. 
The writer of subversive literature, Alexander F. cuts right to the chase of the 
matter: 
Recruiting brutal young roughs for the police. Proposing debilitating 
and will-sapping techniques of conditioning. […] We‟ve seen it all 
before […] in other countries. The thin end of the wedge. Before we 
know where we are we shall have the full apparatus of totalitarianism. 
[…] Will not the Government itself now decide what is and what is not 
crime and pump out the life and guts and will of whoever sees fit to 
displease the Government? (Clockwork 118) 
 
Before Alexander F. realises that the boy he has given shelter in his home is 
the same person who had attacked him and his wife years before, the writer 
contemplates to exploit the boy in his oppositional fight against the new 
regime and its dubious methods. “What a superb device he can be, this boy.” 
(Clockwork 120) Therefore, he decides to use Alex as an instrument in the 
name of liberty: 
Some of us have to fight. There are great traditions of liberty to defend. 
I am no partisan man. Where I see infamy I seek to erase it. Party 
names mean nothing. The tradition of liberty means all. The common 
people will let it go, oh yes. They will sell liberty for a quieter life. That is 
why they must be prodded, prodded – (Clockwork 119) 
 
When the writer recognises his tormentor, he sniffs the chance to kill two 
birds with one stone: on the one hand to exact vengeance on Alex for the 
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death of his wife by trying to drive him into suicide, on the other hand to make 
the suicide look as the consequence of the treatment and therefore the 
government‟s fault. His plan almost succeeds; Alex, however, survives the 
suicide attempt. The writer‟s confederates still triumph on Alex‟s hospital bed: 
Friend […], friend, little friend […] the people are on fire with indignation. 
You have killed those horrible boastful villains‟ chances of re-election. 
They will go and will go for ever and ever. You have served Liberty well. 
(Clockwork 126) 
 
Yet, the government and the Minister of the Interior seem even more 
unscrupulous than their opposition when it comes to exploiting Alex for 
political purposes. After his suicide attempt they manage to persuade him 
that they were his friends and that they would protect him from further attacks 
on behalf of Alexander F. and his confederates. “[…] you‟re safe from him 
now. We put him away.” (Clockwork 131) And, if we take into account what 
has been said about the political offenders, it is easy to imagine what has 
happened to the writer‟s liberty. 
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6. The Manifestations of Positive Liberty in A Clockwork 
Orange 
 
 
6.1. Alex’s Positive Liberty Before Being Exposed to the “Ludovico’s 
Technique” 
 
Positive liberty, by definition, refers to having the competence and power to 
fulfil one‟s own potential and to be the master of his/ her actions. Before the 
treatment Alex appears to be the master of his actions in so far as it is his 
own choice to act the way he acts. His decisions depend solely on himself 
and not on any external forces. Alex seems to be master of his own acts of 
will and not of anybody else‟s. He represents a doer - deciding and not being 
decided for, self-directed and not acted upon by external forces, conceiving 
his goals and plans on his own and realising them. In this respect, he is free. 
However, although not being slave to a man, Alex is a slave to his own 
“unbridled passions, as Berlin puts it (132). Considering the distinction 
between the ideal or true self and the lower nature with its uncontrolled 
impulses, Alex is anything but free according to the postulates of positive 
liberty. In principle, the positive notion of liberty is very idealistic positing that 
true freedom is achieved through moral, ethic, idealistic behaviour. According 
to this theory, the true human nature is good and thus true freedom is 
realised by choosing the good thing and so fulfilling one‟s true nature. Alex, 
however, is a perfect hedonist who lives just for the moment and does not 
calculate the long-term consequences of his irrational actions. His lower 
passions and desires are connected to sex and violence and he lacks 
restraint in the gratification of his various lusts. He would stop at nothing to 
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achieve his aims and satisfy his instincts. Thus, Alex represents the very 
antithesis to the contended slave as discussed by Berlin.  
 
In fact, Alex seems the personification of Sigmund Freud‟s psychic structure 
of the Id. In his famous Structure of Personality theory, Freud constructs a 
theory which says that the human mind is divided into three structures: the 
Ego, the Id and the Super-ego. These operate unconsciously to produce our 
complex manifest behaviour. First, there is the Id, which represents the 
irrational and emotional part of the mind. At birth our mind is all Id, because it 
wants immediate satisfaction of its primitive needs without any delay. Thus, 
the only rule by which the Id is governed is the “pleasure principle”. 
Moreover, the primitive mind of a new-born child basically consists of two 
main drives – the death drive (Thanatos) and the life/ love instinct (Eros or 
Libido). The death drive is concerned with aggression, destruction and death, 
whereas the love or life instinct is related to a psychic energy – mostly sexual 
desire - which wants to preserve the unity and cohesion of life. These two 
basic energies determine the needs and desires of the Id. (see Neill ch.1)  
 
The Ego develops out of growing awareness that in reality you cannot always 
get the immediate satisfaction of your needs and desires. Therefore, the Ego 
tires to relate the needs of the Id to the real world via the “reality principle”. 
The Ego, thus, represents the rational part of the mind which has to negotiate 
between the conflicting impulses coming from the Id and the Super-ego. It 
tries to find a rational compromise between reality, instincts and moral 
principles of the Super-ego. (see Neill ch.2) 
 
The Super-ego develops as the last part of the mind and represents the 
embodiment of parental and social morality. Always striving for a perfection 
ideal and right behaviour it represents a strict system of rules, which is able 
to enforce anxiety as punishment for wrong behaviour. Therefore, feelings of 
guilt and bad conscience are two characteristic features of this structure of 
mind. (see Neill ch.3) 
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In psychoanalytic terms, Alex initially appears to have a far too strong Id 
being intent on self-gratification and completely uncaring to others, whereas 
his Ego seems rather underdeveloped and the Super-ego not existent at all 
due to the seemingly total lack of conscience. In relation to the theory of 
positive liberty, the Id can be equated with what the positive liberty theorists 
call the lower nature or the empirical self that consists of irrational desires 
and impulses. The higher nature, the idealistic, rational and true self can be 
compared to both the Ego and the Super-ego, whereby the rational part is 
represented by the Ego and the idealistic by the Super-ego. 
 
Yet, despite his predilection for violence and antisocial and amoral behaviour, 
Alex is not stupid (unlike Dim). On the contrary, he is very bright and appears 
to posses an immense intellectual capacity, which is also mirrored in his love 
for classical music, Bach, Mozart, Handel and above all Beethoven. “It may 
reflect Burgess„s own prejudices that, feeling some affection for his hero, he 
could not permit him to be a devotee of pop.” (Clockwork xxiii) However, 
Burgess uses music above all to refer to the contemporary public debate 
over whether high art is a civilising force. “The fact that the men who ran 
Auschwitz read Shakespeare and Goethe, and played Bach and Beethoven, 
was much discussed at the time Burgess was writing A Clockwork Orange.” 
(Clockwork xxiii) In the novel Alex also makes fun of the common assumption 
that fine arts contribute to the humanisation of men and have a direct 
influence on the moral character of a human being and therefore foster the 
establishment of positive liberty: 
I had to have a smeck43, though, thinking of what I‟d viddied44 once in 
one of these like articles on Modern Youth, about how Modern Youth 
would be better off if A Lively Appreciation Of The Arts could be like 
encouraged. Great Music, it said, and Great Poetry, would like quieten 
Modern Youth down and make Modern Youth more Civilised. Civilised 
my syphilised yarbles45. Music always sharpend me up, O my brothers, 
and made me like feel like old Bog46 himself, ready to make with the old 
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 Nadsat: laugh. 
44
 Nadsat: to see. 
45
 Nadsat: testicles. 
46
 Nadsat: God. 
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donner and blitzen and have vecks47 and ptitsas48 creeding away in my 
ha ha power. (Clockwork 32)  
 
According to Sigmund Freud fine arts and violent or sexual impulses are 
indeed connected with each other. Here again we encounter the 
phenomenon of sublimation. Aggressive and sexual drives coming from the 
Id cannot be completely repressed by the Ego; therefore they are 
transformed into useful social and cultural energy. According to this theory, 
all cultural and artistic achievements go back to the proscribed impulses 
coming from the Id. Freud‟s psychoanalytic theory does not regard art as 
something purely intellectual and mental descending from the higher spheres 
of the human mind, on the contrary, art has its origins in the repressed 
aggressive and sexual instincts and impulses which seek satisfaction and 
find compensation in artistic and cultural activities.  
 
Yet, this does not necessarily mean that through the process of sublimation 
the preoccupation with arts would quieten the Id impulses and successfully 
repress them. As the debate about Auschwitz and arts shows, and also as it 
is visible in Burgess‟s novel, in some cases art can reinforce and encourage 
the unconscious drives and energies. Listening to music, Alex, for instance, 
goes into raptures over vivid images of brutal violence and sadistic sexual 
acts: 
As I slooshied49, my glazzies50 tight shut to shut in the bliss that was 
better than any synthemesc51 Bog or God, I knew such lovely pictures. 
There were vecks52 and ptitsas53, young and starry, lying on the ground 
screaming for mercy, and I was smecking54 all over my rot and grinding 
my boot in their litsos55. And there were devotchkas56 ripped and 
creeching57 against walls and I plunging like a shlaga58 into them, and 
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indeed when the music, which was one movement only, rose to the top 
of its big highest tower, then, lying there on my bed with glazzies tight 
shut and rookers59 behind my Gulliver, I broke and spattered and cried 
aaaaaah with the bliss of it. And so the lovely music glided to its glowing 
close. (Clockwork 27) 
  
 
6.2. The Paternalistic Principle in A Clockwork Orange  
 
We have already seen in Berlin‟s discussion about positive liberty that the 
notion of the true self or the higher human nature is often associated with a 
collective whole of which the individual is an element or member, for 
instance, a state or a religious community. The danger that is immanent in 
this conception of true freedom is that the collective will is imposed upon the 
individuals and so the members of the community are coerced into doing 
something in the name of a higher goal. For, if they were more enlightened 
they would pursue the goal themselves, the argument runs; yet since they 
are ignorant or corrupt they are unable to see the true nature of freedom or 
goodness and act deviously. Referred to the protagonist of A Clockwork 
Orange, if he knew better, he would choose the good thing, but since he 
does not, he must be coerced to choose it. This renders it easy for the 
collective to coerce others as it is conceived to happen for their own sake. 
Also Alex‟s coercion is justified in the name of goodness and above all in the 
name of his own sanity: 
What is happening to you now is what should happen to any normal 
healthy human organism contemplating the actions of the forces of evil, 
the workings of the principle of destruction. You are being made sane, 
you are being made healthy. […] When we are healthy we respond to 
the presence of the hateful with fear and nausea. (Clockwork 81) 
 
When Alex objects to the proceeding of the treatment trying to persuade the 
psychologists that he has learnt his lesson: “But sir, sirs, I see that it‟s wrong. 
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It‟s wrong because it‟s against like society, it‟s wrong because every veck60 
on earth has the right to live and be happy without being tolchocked61 and 
knifed,” (Clockwork 87) the doctors reply that it is not within his power to 
decide anymore: “The heresy of an age of reason […] I see what is right and 
approve, but I do what is wrong. No, no, my boy, you must leave it to us.” 
(Clockwork 87) Here Burgess demonstrates how the paternalistic supervision 
operates in order to coerce individuals for their own sake and for the sake of 
a community, moreover, in the name of a higher good.  
 
In Recovering the Social Contract Ron Replongle provides a metaphor that 
supports the notion of positive liberty and justifies paternalistic supervision:  
Surely, it is no assault on my dignity as a person if you take my car 
keys, against my will, when I have had too much to drink. There is 
nothing paradoxical about making an agreement beforehand providing 
for paternalistic supervision in circumstances when our competence is 
open to doubt. (Replongle 164) 
 
 
In this respect, positive liberty is seen as a set of rules formulated by the 
members of the community in question with the premise that all members 
have to agree upon the conventions. Taking this into account, positive liberty 
belongs to the field of Social Contract philosophy as advocated by Hobbes, 
Locke and Rousseau. However, Berlin explicitly contradicts any claim that 
positive liberty and paternalism belong together. For Berlin positive liberty 
applies only when the individual himself/ herself decides autonomously, even 
if he/she decides to abandon his/her freedom in pursuit of a higher goal being 
fully aware of alternatives and the consequences.62 Neither a general 
principle nor the norms of a society could be the reason for a withdrawal of 
liberty. In the case of the drunken driver whose car keys are removed against 
his/her will, we speak only then about positive liberty if the driver has, of 
his/her own free will, decided beforehand not to drive drunk. If the remover of 
the keys decides to act this way because he/she feels that the driver should 
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 Nadsat: guy. 
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 Nadsat: to hit. 
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 Compare with the example of the Muslim woman in chapter 2. 
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not drink and drive, yet without the driver himself/herself having made and 
expressed that intention, then this does not constitute positive liberty, but 
paternalism (see Wikipedia ch. 2). In A Clockwork Orange it may be true that 
Alex consents to the Ludovico‟s treatment, however, the boy is far from being 
aware of the consequences and of alternatives. The only thing he wants is to 
get out of prison as soon as possible. On no account does he consent to the 
withdrawal of his ability to choose freely and autonomously between good 
and evil.  
 
 
6.3. The Issue of Positive Liberty After the “Ludovico’s Treatment”  
 
 
After the Ludovico procedure has been successfully completed, the 
psychologists organise a demonstration of Alex‟s recovery in front of a public 
audience consisting of the Minister of the Interior or Inferior, as Alex calls 
him, the Staja63 Governor, the prison charlie, and other important men and 
women.  Alex is presented on a stage being provoked and bullied by an 
unknown man, who offends and hits the boy. Although the young protagonist 
would like to defend himself properly and hit back, he is unable to do so 
because at the very thought of violence he feels sick and painful. So, to 
mitigate the pain and the feelings auf nausea, Alex has to change his 
behaviour into the very opposite and display devoted kindness: 
 
„Please, I must do something. Shall I clean your boots? Look, I‟ll get 
down and lick them.‟ And, my brothers, believe it or kiss my sharries64, I 
got down on my knees and pushed my red yahzick65 out a mile and half 
to lick his grahzny66 vonny67 boots. (Clockwork 93)  
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 Nadsat: state jail. 
64
 Nadsat: balls. 
65
 Nadsat: tongue. 
66
 Nadsat: dirty. 
67
 Nadsat: stinky. 
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The treatment has turned Alex into a submissive slave who has no possibility 
any longer to act and react in accordance with his own will. As Dr Brodsky 
explains: 
Our subject is, you see, impelled towards the good by, paradoxically, 
being impelled towards evil. The intention to act violently is 
accompanied by strong feelings of physical distress. To counter these 
the subject has to switch to a diametrically opposed attitude. (Clockwork 
94)          
        
Yet, it is not only violence that is made impossible, for, the sexual instincts 
appear tabooed as well. As a beautiful girl enters the stage Alex is 
immediately attracted to her and feels sexual desire: “[…] and the first thing 
that flashed into my gulliver68 was that I would like to have her right down 
there on the floor with the old in-out real savage” (Clockwork 95). However, 
the sickness promptly returns and so Alex has to suppress his passions and 
play the role of a submissive devoted knight:  
„Let me,‟ I creeched69 out, „worship you and be like your helper and 
protector from the wicked like world.‟ Then I thought of the right slovo70 
and felt better for it, saying: „Let me be like your true knight,‟ and down I 
went again on the old knees, bowing and like scraping. (Clockwork 96) 
 
Alex is released into a world where he cannot defend himself against the 
hostile environment he returns to. Not only that he is no longer welcome at 
home, but all his former victims now try to take revenge taking advantage of 
his inability to fight back. Moreover, Alex has to abandon many of his former 
rather innocent and harmless hobbies, such as reading the Bible, because 
there is too much description of violence in it so that he feels sick again. Also, 
his former droogs who are policemen now, take pleasure in torturing their 
former ringleader. Finally, F. Alexander abuses Alex for his political and 
private purposes and drives him into suicide with Beethoven‟s Ninth 
Symphony.  
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 Nadsat: head. 
69 
Nadsat: to cry out. 
70 
Nadsat: word. 
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It is fair to say that although Alex has to act according to the conditioning of 
the Ludovico‟s technique displaying socially desirable and acceptable 
behaviour, his basic attitude has not altered. He would definitely hit back if he 
could, moreover, he would be the first one to hit. His hedonistic and antisocial 
passions are not eliminated, on the contrary, they are still vivid and strong, 
and they only cannot be lived out. Therefore, after the treatment, Alex is not 
freer in terms of positive liberty, for his higher nature is not realised 
autonomously, he is only forced to change his behaviour whereas his nature 
remains the same. After Alex has won back his consciousness in the 
hospital, he seems again able to enjoy thoughts about violence as he used to 
before the Ludovico treatment: 
„Ah, shut it,‟ I said, „or I‟ll give you something proper to yowl and 
creech71 about. Kick your zoobies72 in I will.‟ And, O my brothers, saying 
that made me feel a malenky73 bit better, as if all like fresh red red 
krovvy74 was flowing all through my plott75. That was something I had to 
think about. It was like as though to get better I had had to get worse. 
(Clockwork 128) 
 
Obviously the doctors have used Alex‟s blackout to undo the Ludovico 
conditioning and re-establish his freedom of choice. “‟Deep hypnopaedia,‟ or 
some such slovo76, said one of these two vecks77. „You seem to be cured.‟” 
(Clockwork 130) In fact, the government had to react on the massive public 
pressure after Alex‟s suicide attempt; that is why they set out the withdrawal 
of Alex‟s conditioning. Also, as the government‟s image is endangered, the 
Minister of the Interior makes an agreement with Alex promising him his 
liberty and moreover his security and a carefree life, if he helps them to 
spruce up the government‟s image. “We always help our friends, don‟t we?” 
(Clockwork 131) So Alex‟s life seems re-established and from now on he 
would be free to do whatever pleases him with the government officially 
backing him up.  
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 Nadsat: scream. 
72 
Nadsat: teeth. 
73 
Nadsat: little. 
74 
Nadsat: blood. 
75
 Nadsat: flesh.  
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Nadsat: word. 
77 
Nadsat: guys. 
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6.4. The Controversy Relating to the Novel’s Last Chapter 
 
The last chapter, the one omitted in the US edition and in Kubrick‟s movie, 
represents a turning point and contains Burgess‟s main message, namely, 
that humans are creatures capable of moral growth. What we get in the last 
chapter is, after all, a protagonist who is gradually growing up and starting to 
feel responsibility for his own life and for those of others. He finds no 
satisfaction any longer in being the leader of his new gang and leading a 
criminal life as he used to before his confinement: “But somehow, my 
brothers, I felt very bored and a bit hopeless, and I had been feeling that a lot 
these days.” (Clockwork 134) Also, “More and more these days I had been 
just giving the orders and standing back to viddy78 them being carried out” 
(Clockwork 134). What is more, Alex suddenly feels the desire to accumulate 
money, “to like hoard it all up for some reason” (Clockwork 135) and not to 
waste it on unreasonable things like paying Scotchmen rounds for his friends 
and the “old baboochkas79”. Generally, Alex seems quieter and softer; he 
even prefers romantic songs to his once beloved classical music: 
I was slooshying80 more like malenky81 romantic songs, what they call 
Lieder, just a goloss82 and a piano, very quiet and like yearny, different 
from when it had been all bolshy83 orchestras and me lying on the bed 
between the violins and the trombones and kettledrums. There was 
something happening inside me, and I wondered if it was like some sort 
of disease or if it was what they had done to me that time upsetting my 
gulliver84 and perhaps going to make me real bezoomny85. (Clockwork 
137)  
 
As Alex encounters his old droog Pete again, who is now married and leads 
an ordinary, harmless life, Alex realises that his own inner changes which he 
could not explain are happening due to himself growing-up. “I was getting too 
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 Nadsat: to see. 
79
 Nadsat: old women. 
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 Nadsat: to listen. 
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 Nadsat: head. 
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 Nadsat: mad. 
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old for the sort of jeezny86 I had been leading, brothers. I was eighteen now, 
just gone. Eighteen was not a young age.” (Clockwork 140) Finally, he 
senses a strong desire for an ordinary life too and expresses a wish for a 
family life with a wife and a baby. He realises that being young means like 
being steered as a toy, as a clockwork: “Being young is like being like one of 
these malenky87 machines” (Clockwork 140). Eventually, Alex finds his 
positive liberty, for now he seems to understand the higher aims of human 
nature and life, which imply taking responsibility towards oneself and other 
people. He ascribes his former crimes and misdemeanour to his immaturity - 
the immaturity of the youth, who have to learn and realise their human nature 
gradually as they grow-up: 
When I had my son I would explain all that to him when he was starry 
enough to like understand. But then I knew he would not understand or 
would not want to understand at all and would do the veshches88 I had 
done, yes perhaps even killing some poor starry forella89 surrounded 
with mewing kots and koshkas90, and I would not be able to really stop 
him. And nor would he be able to stop his own son, brothers. And so it 
would itty on to like the end of the world, round and round and round, 
like some bolshy gigantic like chelloveck91, like Bog Himslef (by 
courtesy of Korova Milk-bar) turning and turning and turning a vonny92 
grahzny93 orange in his gigantic rookers94. (Clockwork 140-141) 
 
The last chapter was cut in the US edition of the novel – and not restored 
until 1988, twenty-six years later. Therefore it was also left out in Stanley 
Kubrick‟s film, for the film director was only acquainted with the American 
version. Like many other critics, he later even openly disapproved of 
Burgess‟s ending finding it too optimistic: “to end with Alex‟s cynical return to 
his violent ways („I was cured all right‟) is, they say, tougher and more 
realistic.” (Clockwork xxi) However, Burgess‟s ending contains a pessimistic 
touch as well by showing that Alex‟s sins will be reproduced again and again 
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by next generations of adolescents, and “Burgess sees no means of stopping 
the cycle of adolescent violence, except with methods, whether aversion 
therapy, eugenics or other forms of socio-psychological programming, which 
are dehumanizing, morally unacceptable and a usurpation of God.” 
(Clockwork xxii)  
 
In an interview with the Penthouse magazine in 1972 Anthony Burgess 
explains why the last chapter was omitted in the US version: 
My American publisher in 1962 said “I recognize that you are British 
and hence tend to a more pragmatic or milk-and-water tradition than we 
Americans know. We are tougher than you and prepared to end on a 
tough and violent note.” And I said: “Well, if this is one of the conditions 
for publishing the book, get on with it.” (qtd. in Aggeler 179) 
 
Burgess later bitterly regretted this decision for basically two reasons. First, 
the book‟s structural, “even numerological” unity was destroyed:  
Burgess divides A Clockwork Orange into three sections, each 
beginning with the same punkily defiant question: „What‟s it going to be 
then, eh?‟ There are twenty-one chapters in all: twenty-one is the age at 
which children traditionally become adult, and it is in the twenty-first 
chapter that Alex sees the light and puts the errors of youth behind him. 
Burgess would also have been struck by aptness, in a novel about 
growing up, of there being seven chapters in each section: an implicit 
allusion to Shakespeare‟s seven ages of man. As all this suggests, A 
Clockwork Orange is the most carefully constructed of novels. 
(Clockwork xx) 
 
Second, the loss of the chapter destroys the book‟s moral integrity. Burgess 
“felt there was little point in writing a novel which didn‟t allow for moral 
growth, and found something glib, cynical and sensationalizing in the 
abridgement” (Clockwork xx). For the author his last chapter shows that Alex 
is a human being willing to learn from those older than himself – or as he 
puts it: “to slooshy95 what some of these starry decreps96 had to say about 
life and the world” (Clockwork 12). In fact, his willingness to learn becomes 
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visible “as early as Chapter 2” and is picked up again in prison, when “he 
reads the Bible for enlightenment and comfort” (Clockwork xx). 
All this prepares the ground for Alex‟s reform. There is no deus ex 
machina in his eventual getting of wisdom. All he lacks is time, and the 
three years that pass in the course of the book are what makes the 
difference. (Clockwork xx)  
 
The final chapter shows that Alex is able to autonomously choose goodness. 
It demonstrates that despite his evil impulses and lusts, he is still inherently 
good (see Wenzl 44). Moreover, he is able to achieve his potential and 
therefore to justify his positive liberty. Burgess weighed great importance to 
his moral message. In the 1988 US edition of his novel, which eventually 
included the last chapter, he cynically commented in the preface: “My book 
was Kennedyian and accepted the notion of moral progress. What was really 
wanted was a Nixonian book with no shred of optimism in it.” (Clockwork xvii) 
 
 
6.5. Burgess’s Novel and Kubrick’s Film  
 
Although the author had the comfort of knowing that foreign translations of 
the book (French, Italian, Spanish, Romanian, Russian, German etc.) were 
based on the original English version, most people only know A Clockwork 
Orange in its US version due to Stanley Kubrick‟s film adaption (see 
Clockwork xvii). The celebrated film director was fascinated by the novel and 
found it bizarre, exciting and brilliantly developed (see Nelson 136). Thus his 
primer “intention was to be faithful to the novel” (Kubrick, qtd. in Nelson137) 
when he adapted it for film. Burgess himself was an admirer of Stanley 
Kubrick, especially of his film 2001: A Space Odyssey, and “hoped the film of 
A Clockwork Orange would aspire to a similarly imaginative „visual futurism‟” 
(Clockwork xviii).  
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However, the film provided the cause for some serious tensions between the 
two artists. First, of course, the abridged version irritated Burgess, who had 
even written a script for the film, which was, like several others, rejected by 
Kubrick. Second, Burgess had sold the film rights to Kubrick‟s producers for a 
relatively small amount of money, and reaped no benefit when the movie 
became a world success. Third, the author disapproved of the presentation of 
violence in the film, which he found too stark and unfiltered despite Kubrick‟s 
use of parodic techniques. Privately he was worried about the explicit 
presentation of sexuality and suspected some scenes of the movie of being 
pornographic (see Clockwork xviii). Finally, Burgess was infuriated by the 
implication of some critics claiming that though the writer was the originator 
of A Clockwork Orange, Stanley Kubrick was “its true artistic spirit” 
(Clockwork xviii). Burgess, being very touchy at that suggestion, replied that, 
if anything, “Kubrick was a creation of his” (Clockwork xviii). Nevertheless, it 
should be acknowledged that the author also profited from the film adaption 
in so far as the film has made the novel as well as Burgess himself 
considerably popular. 
 
When the film was released in 1971, both the film and the book were heavily 
criticised and accused of being an incitement to violence. In the UK the 
banning of the film was considered and discussed in Parliament. As a result, 
Kubrick himself withdrew the film from the British market, where it is still 
unavailable (see Clockwork xix). In the US the press considered Kubrick and 
Burgess responsible for various cases of youth delinquency and violence. 
Burgess, who found that his novel‟s reputation had been tainted, was, for the 
rest of his life, always interviewed and invited to TV shows whenever the 
moral responsibility of the artist towards the youth was to be discussed (see 
Wenzl 47).The writer strongly rejected the notion that art could be 
responsible for the events which happen in real life: 
The fundamental answer is, no, no one is responsible. If I am 
responsible for young boys beating up old men or killing old women 
after having seen the film then Shakespeare is responsible every time 
some young man decides to kill his uncle and blames it on Hamlet. [...] 
there was a man in New York State who killed something like sixteen 
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children, slaughtered them in cold blood, and he said he was fascinated 
by the stories of blood sacrifice in the Old Testament and he merely 
wanted to present a sweet offering to the Lord. (qtd. in Wenzl 47) 
 
However, twenty years later the artist‟s convictions about the moral influence 
of art were fundamentally changed. In 1993, a few months before his death, 
he expressed concern in an article for the Observer whether A Clockwork 
Orange might not have contributed in some way to a certain cult of violence 
among the youth: 
[I]t must be considered a kind of grace in my old age to abandon a 
conviction that was part of my blood and bone. I mean the conviction 
that the arts were sacrosanct, and that included the sub-arts, that they 
would never be accused of exerting either a moral or an immoral 
influence, that they were incorrupt, incorruptive, incorruptible. I have 
quite recently changed my mind about that.   
This protective attitude to the arts was really a desire to justify the 
corrupt elements in the greatest literature of all time. That of the 
Elizabethan stage. It was a wish not to see William Shakespeare as a 
violent writer...  
But I begin to accept that, as a novelist, I belong to the ranks of the 
menacing. (Clockwork xxiv) 
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7. The Role of Language in 1984 and A Clockwork Orange 
 
 
Comparing the two novels one striking similarity immediately becomes 
evident, namely the playful use of language on the part of both authors, 
Orwell and Burgess, though each one exhibits a slightly different approach to 
his linguistic experiment. Orwell‟s Newspaek is concerned with reducing the 
English language and cutting down the range of vocabulary; whereas 
Burgess‟s Anglo-Russian slang called Nadsat displays an expanded 
vocabulary enriched by Slavic words. Both authors were profoundly 
interested in language and knew about its political and sociological 
dimension – for this purpose see also Orwell‟s famous essay Politics and The 
English Language (1946) and Burgess‟s book Language Made Plain (1964, 
revised 1975). As far as the aspect of liberty in relation to the experimental 
language of the novels is concerned, some analogies can be observed and 
should be discussed in the following chapters. 
 
 
7.1. Orwell’s Conception of Language  
 
Orwell was preoccupied with language and language change. Although he 
called for socio-political change, he was nostalgic for the cultural age he 
observed vanishing and his attitudes towards language were also remarkably 
preserving (see Bolton 15). “In his literary criticism he made language a 
touchstone for good writing and for bad.” (Bolton 15) His values concerning 
language pervade his writing from the very beginning on, yet, 1984 and the 
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essay Politics and the English Language characterise his mindset on this 
issue most strikingly.  
 
In this oft-cited essay the writer criticises the decline of the English language 
making clear that it must ultimately have socio-political and economic causes 
and cannot be traced back to the bad influence of an individual writer, yet the 
trend has a negative effect on Modern English, especially written English. 
Orwell argues that the English language “becomes ugly and inaccurate 
because our thoughts are foolish, but the slovenliness of our language 
makes it easier for us to have foolish thoughts.” (Politics97 par. 2) In other 
words, the shape of our thinking has a direct effect on our language, but the 
shape of our language has also a direct effect on our thinking. If the language 
is corrupt, the ideas we have are corrupt as well, and vice versa. This vicious 
cycle can be broken “if one is willing to take the necessary trouble. If one 
gets rid of these habits one can think more clearly, and to think more clearly 
is a first step towards political regeneration.” (Politics par. 2) Therefore, a 
sane and frank use of language finally reinforces a respectable political 
disposition. Orwell then goes on exemplifying what he considers bad habits 
in the English language, for instance the overuse of metaphors, long words 
where short ones would do as well, foreign phrases, scientific words or 
jargon instead of simple everyday English equivalents, the use of ready-
made phrases etc., and concludes that the “whole tendency of modern prose 
is away from concreteness” and concealing the true meaning (see Politics 
par. 19). 
 
It is, Orwell says, exactly at this point, that the special connection between 
politics and the corruption of language becomes evident: 
Orthodoxy, of whatever colour, seems to demand a lifeless, imitative 
style. The political dialects to be found in pamphlets, leading articles, 
manifestos, White Papers and the speeches of under-secretaries do, of 
course, vary from party to party, but they are all alike in that one almost 
never finds in them a fresh, vivid, home-made turn of speech. When 
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one watches some tired hack on the platform mechanically repeating 
the familiar phrases – bestial atrocities, iron heel, bloodstained tyranny, 
free peoples of the world, stand shoulder to shoulder – one often has a 
curious feeling that one is not watching a live human being but some 
kind of dummy: a feeling which suddenly becomes stronger at moments 
when the light catches the speaker‟s spectacles and turns them into 
blank  discs which seem to have no eyes behind them. And this is not 
altogether fanciful. A speaker who uses that kind of phraseology has 
gone same distance towards turning himself into a machine. The 
appropriate noises are coming out of his larynx, but his brain is not 
involved as it would be if he were choosing his words for himself. If the 
speech he is making is one that he is accustomed to make over and 
over again, he may be almost unconscious of what he is saying, as one 
is when one utters the responses in church. And this reduced state of 
consciousness, if not indispensable, is at any rate favourable to political 
conformity. (Politics par. 21) 
 
What the writer describes here, has been expansively developed and 
elaborated in 1984; Specifically the kind of political speech illustrated in the 
quotation above also occurs in the novel under the name of duckspeak. 
Another occurrence of political speech mentioned in the essay and conveyed 
to the novel is the aspect of euphemisms. “In our time, political speech and 
writing are largely the defence of the indefensible” and therefore – so the 
argument runs – “political language has to consist largely of euphemisms, 
question-begging and sheer cloudy vagueness”. (Politics par. 22) The use of 
such phraseology is needed if one wants to name things without showing 
their brutality, for instance to call the bombarding of defenceless villages and 
the banishment of their inhabitants by the name of pacification (see Politics 
par. 22). “Political language – and with variations this is true of all political 
parties, from Conservatives to Anarchists – is designed to make lies sound 
truthful and murder respectable, and to give an appearance of solidity to pure 
wind,” Orwell states (Politics par. 30). If we, as an example, think of the 
names of the four ministries in 1984, it is clear that the same is true for them. 
Orwell‟s reasoning comes to the point that there are no apolitical issues at all 
since everything that surrounds us is political in some or the other way. 
Therefore, language as such is always a political force, and when the general 
atmosphere in a state is bad, the language must suffer too. However, we can 
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counteract this general debasement by improving our language habits and 
thus improving the political situation eventually as well.  
  
Although Orwell was a sharp observer and critic of language and its change, 
he could not refer to a linguistic university education, and according to Bolton 
he “knew no more about language, then, than the average Briton of his time 
and class might have known, and perhaps a trifle less” (Bolton 21). Still, his 
views on language have been highly influential and adopted by many, for 
instance Noam Chomsky and Norman Miller cited Orwell in support of their 
own political position as opponents of the American‟s war policy in Vietnam 
(see Bolton 16). Also many other political liberals and leftists held Orwell‟s 
linguistic views in high esteems. Arthur Schlesinger Jr, an American historian 
and Pulitzer Price recipient, supported Orwell‟s views stating that “the control 
of language is a necessary step toward the control of minds, as Orwell made 
so brilliantly clear in 1984” (qtd. in Bolton 17). The terminology of 1984 has 
become extremely popular with doublethink appearing in college dictionaries 
and Newspeak being a “dysphemism for utterances, notably in politics and 
advertising, much as „fascism‟ had become a dysphemism for political 
systems” (Bolton 15). 
 
However, Orwell had not only proponents of his theories:  He was criticised 
for the lack of deeper understanding in the field of linguistics and overall 
superficiality in his analysis of the problems. Also, his essay was reproached 
for “massive over-generalizations without any supporting data or examples” 
(Rank, qtd. in Bolton 17).   
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7.2. The Language of 1984  
 
 
In the Appendix of 1984 George Orwell provides us with The Principles of 
Newspeak – a treatise on the imaginary language as developed and 
illustrated in the novel. The writer, although using some technical terms of 
linguistics, uses none that a non-specialist reader would not be able to grasp 
(see Bolton 21). First, the imaginary language is defined as the official 
language of Oceania, which was designed to meet the ideological needs of 
the Party and which should finally supersede Standard English – Oldspeak - 
by about 2050. The version in the year 1984, embodied in the Eleventh 
Edition of the Dictionary, though perfected, is only a provisional one that still 
contains many superfluous and archaic forms which should be abandoned 
later. As far as its use in everyday life is concerned, Newspeak is mainly 
applied for official purposes, whereas the average citizen still uses Oldspeak 
in his/ her daily routine.  
 
Newspeak, Orwell proceeds, is founded on the English language and 
consists of three distinctive word classes, known as the A vocabulary, the B 
vocabulary and the C vocabulary. The A vocabulary mainly consists of 
Standard English words needed for business and in everyday life – verbs like 
eating, drinking, working; nouns like dog, tree, house etc – with the difference 
to Oldspeak that now their meanings are rigidly defined or reduced and all 
possible ambiguities eliminated. The words belonging to this class are 
intended to express only simple, purposive thoughts, concrete objects and 
actions, whereby one word stands for exactly one concept and allows no 
shades of meaning. Hence, it would be scarcely possible to express 
philosophical or political ideas with them (see 1984 314). 
  
The B vocabulary comprises words which are constructed for political 
purposes only with the intention to “impose a desirable mental attitude upon 
the person using them” (1984 316). Thus, no word of this class is 
ideologically neutral, but conveys the values of Ingsoc, for example, 
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thoughtcrime, crimestop, goodsex, sexcrime etc. As far as the word formation 
is concerned, the B words are in all cases compound words consisting of two 
or more words „welded together in an easily pronounceable form‟: 
To take a single example: the word goodthink, meaning, very roughly, 
„orthodoxy‟, or, if one chose to regard it as a verb, „to think in an 
orthodox manner‟. This inflected as follows: noun-verb, goodthink; past 
tense and past participle, goodthinked; present participle, goodthinking, 
adjective, goodthinkful; adverb, goodthinkwise; verbal noun; 
goodthinker. (1984 317) 
 
The quotation above also indicates the basic grammatical rules of Newspeak 
– the interchangeability between the verb and the noun forms, the overall 
regularity of inflection or the reduction of irregular verb forms, and the rules 
for the formation of the adjective and adverb. Further, the use of the affixes 
un-, plus-, doubleplus-, ante-, post-, up-, down-, etc. is applied to modify the 
meaning of Newspeak words and contributes to the enormous reduction of 
vocabulary (see 1984 315). Another outstanding characteristic of B 
vocabulary - euphemism - refers back to Orwell‟s amplification about the use 
of euphemisms in political speech in the Politics and the English Language 
essay, which was written two years before he wrote the novel. In 1984 words 
“as joycamp (forced-labour-camp) or Minipax (Ministry of Peace, i.e. Ministry 
of War) meant almost the exact opposite of what they appeared to mean” 
(1984 319).The C vocabulary, finally, consists of technical and scientific 
terms. 
 
In general, Newspeak concerns itself with the reduction of vocabulary to an 
absolute minimum needed for communication. In accordance with Orwell‟s 
theory of the relationship between politics and language as outlined in his 
famous essay, the intrinsic purpose of the designed language in 1984 is the 
limitation of free thought: 
The purpose of Newspeak was not only to provide a medium of 
expression for the world-view and mental habits proper to the devotees 
of Ingsoc, but to make all other modes of thought impossible. It was 
intended that when Newspeak had been adopted once and for all and 
Oldspeak forgotten, a heretical thought - that is, a thought diverging 
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from the principles of Ingsoc – should be literally unthinkable, at least so 
far as thought is dependent on words.  (1984 312)  
 
This statement grounds on the belief that language and thought are in so far 
interdependent as the limitations of the one imply the limitations of the other. 
As Ludwig Wittgenstein, one of the most influential philosophers of the 
twentieth century has pointed out in his highly celebrated work on the 
essence of life and world, Tractatus Logico Philosophicus: “Die Grenzen 
meiner Sprache bedeuten die Grenzen meiner Welt.” (Wittgenstein 5.6.)To 
exemplify this argument, let us investigate the concept of political and 
intellectual freedom, which, as we know, has no existence in Oceania and 
therefore has no name. The word free can only be used in sentences as 
“This dog is free from lice,” (1984 313) however, in the context of human 
liberty it is simply meaningless. So, the term free as such is retained for the 
sake of convenience, yet the undesired meaning has been purged out of it 
(see 1984 318).Thus, since there is no such thing as political or intellectual 
liberty, there is no appropriate term for it. Moreover, since there is no term for 
such a concept, the idea of liberty should never occur to anybody, according 
to this theory. The same is applicable to the concept of equality: 
A person growing up with Newspeak as his sole language would no 
more know that equal had once had the secondary meaning of 
„politically equal‟ or that free had once meant „intellectually free‟, than, 
for instance, a person who had never heard of chess would be aware of 
the secondary meanings attached to queen and rook. There would be 
many crimes and errors which it would be beyond his power to commit, 
simply because they were nameless and therefore unimaginable. (1984 
324)  
 
Furthermore, the concepts of honour, justice, morality, internationalism, 
democracy, science and religion have completely ceased to exist, i.e. there 
are no terms which would express their meaning. They all, including liberty 
and freedom, are now summarised under the concept of crimethink (see 
1984 318).Newspeak, as a matter of fact, differs from all other languages in 
the respect that it grows smaller and smaller, as far as vocabulary is 
concerned, each day with every reduction being regarded as an achievement 
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– “since the smaller the area of choice, the smaller the temptation to take 
thought” (1984 322).If we apply Berlin‟s theory of liberty to Orwell‟s 
deliberations about language, then we can regard the state‟s prescriptive 
policy of language reduction and change as an interference on behalf of the 
government that ultimately limits the speaking options of individual speakers. 
It is then reasonable to say that the official diminution of language 
corresponds to the reduction of negative liberty. Yet, the decreasing of 
vocabulary pursues the ultimate goal of reducing the range of thought. 
“Ultimately it was hoped to make articulate speech issue from the larynx 
without involving the higher brain centres at all.” (1984 322) 
 
In respect thereof it becomes evident that the diminution of vocabulary aims 
at the limitation of positive liberty as well. In the case of Orwellian language 
theory then, an incident can be observed, where the limitation of negative 
liberty is in accordance with the limitation of positive liberty. In general, the 
degradation of language in 1984 symbolises the restriction of freedom and 
unveils the special connection between the use of language and the area of 
liberty.  
 
 
7.3. The Function of Language in A Clockwork Orange 
 
Apart from the public heed caused by Stanley Kubrick‟s film adaptation of A 
Clockwork Orange Anthony Burgess‟s novel became particularly famous for 
its language, a constructed vernacular, spoken by Alex and his gang called 
Nadsat. The name is a transliteration of the Russian suffix for “teen” (see 
Clockwork ix). The language experiment can be ascribed to the author‟s own 
interest in linguistics and the history of language, as becomes also visible in 
his work published a couple of years after A Clockwork Orange, Language 
Made Plain (1964) (see Dix 14). Carol M. Dix attributes to Burgess to be one 
of the few English authors “who makes the fullest use of the raw materials of 
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writing, that is the words themselves” (Dix 21). Further, his linguistic 
explorations and the experimental use of language render him “one of the 
most adventurous writers”, however, they also “make him a difficult writer, for 
the experiments are often esoteric, academic, and cut him off, to a certain 
extent, from the ordinary reader” (Dix 21).  
One has always to remember that Burgess is not only a skilful 
craftsman in the construction of plots and his creation of characters, but 
also an extremely clever and agile-minded man, who draws upon all the 
resources of knowledge in his writing. Some of his novels could 
perhaps benefit a glossary. (Dix 21) 
 
 
Referring to glossary, the first American edition and the first German 
translation of A Clockwork Orange contained a glossary, yet without the 
approval of Anthony Burgess. The very idea of a glossary contradicts the 
author‟s intentions in creating an artificial slang for his characters. The 
vernacular spoken in the novel consists of odd bits of rhyming slang, some 
Gypsy talk and for the most part of Slavic, basically Russian derivates (see 
Dix 14). At first sight the vocabulary of Alex and his droogs appears 
incomprehensible: 
They had no licence for selling liquor, but there was no law yet against 
prodding some of the new veshches which they used to put into the old 
moloko, so you could peet it with vellocet or synthemesc or drencrom or 
one or two other veshches which would give you a nice quite 
horrorshow fifteen minutes of admiring Bog And All His Holy Angels 
And Saints in your left shoe with lights bursting all over your mozg. 
(Clockwork 3)  
 
 
However, as the novel proceeds, one begins to gradually grasp the meaning 
of the picturesque, exotic language, even without knowing the basics of 
Slavic languages, partly due to context and frequent recurrence of terms to 
which one then becomes accustomed, partly due to the author giving the 
proper translation himself: For instance, a paragraph about the gratifications 
of deng ends with: “But as they say, money isn‟t everything.” (Clockwork 3) 
This step-by-step acquisition of Nadsat vocabulary is exactly what the writer 
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had in mind when coining the language, which encompasses about two-
hundred words:  
It was meant to turn A Clockwork Orange in a brainwashing primer. You 
read the book or see the film, and at the end you should find yourself in 
possession of a minimal Russian vocabulary – without effort, with 
surprise. This is how brainwashing works. (Burgess, qtd. in Aggeler 
182)  
 
Considering the fact that the novel deals with the issue of brainwashing, it 
appears utterly brilliant and ingenious the way Burgess has played with 
words in order to demonstrate by the example of language how subtly 
brainwashing actually operates. Dix also argues that the language provides 
us with information about the history and the whereabouts of the strange 
futuristic society depicted in the novel, of which nothing specific is known, 
except for what we can deduce from the language spoken by the youth. “The 
society obviously has been subject to both American and Russian 
intervention if not invasion. The derivate language, spoken by the young, 
probably indicates the effects of propaganda through subliminal penetration.” 
(Dix 14) 
„Quaint,‟ said Dr Brodsky, like smiling, „the dialect of the tribe. Do you 
know anything of its provenance, Branom?‟  
„Odd bits of old rhyming slang,‟ said Dr Branom, who did not look quite 
so much like a friend any more. „A bit of gypsy talk, too. But most of the 
roots are Slav. Propaganda. Subliminal penetration.‟ (Clockwork 86) 
 
Obviously, Burgess gained the inspiration for the use of Russian vocabulary 
for his novel about violent teenage gangs during a stay in Russia in 1961: 
My late wife and I spent part of the summer of 1961 in Soviet Russia, 
where it was evident that the authorities had problems with turbulent 
youth not much different from our own. The stilyagi, or style-boys, 
where smashing faces and windows, and the police, apparently 
obsessed with ideological and fiscal crimes, seemed powerless to keep 
them under. It struck me that it might be a good idea to create a kind of 
young hooligan who bestrode the iron curtain and spoke an argot 
compounded of the two most powerful political languages in the world - 
Anglo-American and Russian. The irony of the style would lie in the 
hero-narrator's being totally unpolitical. (qtd. in Carlin par. 1) 
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Burgess did not use Russian words in a literal sense; on the contrary, he 
deliberately abused them, i.e. used them for his own purposes and altered 
them slightly and anglicised them. His motives were mainly connected to the 
aesthetic, specifically the phonetic side of language. For, besides being a 
writer, Burgess was an accomplished musician too who claimed to approach 
writing through aural images (see Dix 25). And if we compare expressions 
like grahzny bratchny and lubbilubbing to their English equivalents “dirty 
bastard” and “making love”, they certainly appear - or rather sound - more 
sonorous than in English language, and have a touch of magic spell (see 
Realus ch. 2). “Burgess chose his 200 or so words of nadsat because they 
work in English, whether as poetry, or humour (what could be more comical 
than policemen being millicents?), or plausible slang.” (Clockwork x) Also, the 
writer had a preference for ambiguity, which can be seen in word creations 
such as rabbit, meaning “work” and descending from the Russian verb 
rabotat, yet also suggesting rab - Russian for slave – and carrying an allusion 
to “robot” (see Clockwork x). Further, the Russian word khorosho (good or 
well) is anglicised into horrorshow – a frequent term used by Alex to express 
rapture or approbation in general; iudi (people) becomes lewdies, militsia 
(police) is turned into millicents. Pooshka (cannon) stands for a pistol; rozha 
(grimace) becomes rozz, which is also one of the words for policeman; 
soomka (bag) indicates an ugly woman (see Realus ch. 2). Groodies comes 
from grud (breast); yarbles represents testicles and may be connected to the 
Russian term for apples (yabloko) because Alex once greets a government 
official with “Bolshy great yarblockos to thee and thine” (Clockwork x). 
Devotchka is woman or girl, glazzies stand both for eyes and nipples, rookers 
(from ruka) can be both hands and arms, nogas (from noga) both feet and 
legs. Further examples are litso (face), rot (mouth), zoobies (teeth), yahzick 
(tongue) and gulliver (from golova), which is the term for head and a hint at 
Jonathan Swift (see Clockwork x).  
 
The Slavic argot is mixed with other aspects of language, for instance, Alex‟ 
way of speaking includes repetitions such as “creech creech creeching 
away”. Also, there is the rhyming slang, e.g. Pretty polly is rhyming slang 
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standing for money (and rhyming with lolly), and to do something oddy 
knocky is to do it on your own (see Clockwork x, xi). Elements of Gypsy talk 
can be found too, for example in expressions like crark (to yowl), golly (unit of 
money), filly (to play or fool with), etc. Sometimes, inevitable associations 
occur as well – cancer for cigarette, pan-handle for erection, charlie for 
chaplain, mounch for snack – and various neologisms produced by simple 
school-boy speak transformations – appy polly loggy (apology), jammywam 
(jam), eggiweg (egg), baddiwad (bad), skolliwoll (school), etc. Words like guff 
(guffaw), sarky (sarcastic), pee and em (pop and mom), and sinny (cinema) 
represent amputations (see Realus ch. 2). But, most of the roots are Slavic, 
as the author himself explains: 
Russian loanwords fit better in English than those from German, 
French, or Italian. English, anyway, is already a kind of mélange of 
French and German. Russian has polysyllables like zhevotnoye for 
beast, and ostanovka avtobusa is not so good as bus stop. But it also 
has brevities like brat for brother and grud for breast. The English 
word, in which four consonants strangle one short vowel, is inept for 
that glorious smooth roundness. Groodies would be right. In the 
manner of the Eastern languages, Russian makes no distinction 
between leg and foot - noga for both - or hand and arm, which are 
alike ruka. This limitation would turn my horrible young narrator into a 
clockwork toy with inarticulated limbs. As there were much violence in 
the draft smouldering in my drawer, and would be even more in the 
finished work, the strange new lingo would act as a kind of mist half-
hiding the mayhem and protecting the reader from his own baser 
instincts. And there was a fine irony in the notion of a teenager race 
untouched by politics, using totalitarian brutality as an end in itself, 
equipped with a dialect which drew on the two chief political languages 
of the age. (You’ve Had Your Time 38) 
  
As can be seen in the quotation above one of the main reasons the writer 
has used a foreign language is to turn away the attention of the reader from 
the extreme, violent behaviour on behalf of the protagonist and his friends, 
hoping that the reader would then see beyond the mere description of 
violence. For, given the fact that most humans tend to react with repulsion to 
such exaggerated brutality as performed by Alex, the writer rightly assumed 
that this factor would influence the reader‟s feelings, mainly stiffen them, for 
the main character. But Burgess wanted the reader to be objective, or rather 
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not influenced by his/her own lower instincts, but to search and see the 
deeper meaning behind his work. In other words, he wanted the reader not to 
focus on the aspects of crime and punishment, but on the aspects of free 
choice and its importance for humanity.  
 
In comparison to George Orwell‟s novel, where we have a reduction of 
language as a stylistic feature, we find in Anthony Burgess‟s novel a case 
where the language is enriched and flooded with foreign terms and phrases. 
As has been pointed out, in 1984 the reduction of language indicates a 
reduction of freedom. Considering this aspect, can we draw analogies and 
apply the connection between freedom and language to A Clockwork Orange 
too? As a proposition, it should be investigated if the enrichment and the 
frontier crossing of languages in A Clockwork Orange symbolise Alex‟s 
crossing of the frontier and infraction of his legitimate area of liberty (i.e. 
negative liberty). Undoubtedly Alex violates the Harm Principle (J.S. Mill) and 
expands at his own pleasure the rightful area of liberty to which every human 
being has a right to, according to John Stuart Mill (i.e. the area in which my 
freedom does no harm to other members of a community). He therefore 
presumes to have more rights and a larger amount of liberty than he is 
entitled to. It can hence be claimed that this fact is also signified by the 
language: For, the expansion of (negative) liberty is mirrored in the 
expansion of Alex‟s vocabulary. His opulent use of language expresses his 
exuberant dealing with freedom and its limits, and so by expanding the limits 
of the English language he expands the limits of his freedom and vice versa.  
 
Another difference to George Orwell becomes visible in Burgess‟s optimistic 
attitudes towards language as expressed in the concluding paragraphs of his 
considerations in Language Made Plain. Whereas Orwell is preoccupied with 
the purity of the English language detesting the use of foreign words, for 
instance Latin, where English equivalents would do just fine, Anthony 
Burgess does not see the dangers of a pollution through foreign loanwords 
pointing out that English has well survived the Danish and Norman invaders 
and will continue to profit from loan-forms and word coinages of the mixed 
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populations (see Language98 198) Far from being prescriptive, Burgess has 
obviously grasped the new ethnological order in the English speaking world 
and favours the concept of language as a dynamic, ever changing continuum 
rather than a static, self-contained principle.   
 
However, he also admits that a certain debasement of language has 
occurred which has to be fought against. In this respect his views resemble 
those of George Orwell:  
But, if we cannot really resist change, we can resist inflation, that 
debasement of language which is the saddest and most dangerous 
phenomenon of a world dominated by propaganda machines, whether 
religious, political, or commercial. Propaganda always lies, because it 
overstates a case, and the lies tend more and more to reside in the 
words used, not in the total propositions made out of those words. A 
"colossal" film can only be bettered by a "super-colossal" one; soon the 
hyperbolic forces ruin all meaning. If moderately tuneful pop songs are 
described as "fabulous," what terms can be used to evaluate 
Beethoven's Ninth Symphony? The impressionable young--on both 
sides of the Atlantic--are being corrupted by the salesmen; they are 
being equipped with a battery of inflated words, being forced to evaluate 
alley-cat copulation in terms appropriate to the raptures of Tristan and 
Isolde. For the real defilers of language--the cynical inflators--a deep 
and dark hell is reserved. (Language 198) 
 
Still, however dark the language snapshot in time may be, Anthony Burgess 
does not lose his optimism for the future and his earnest belief in the power 
of language:  
Yet language survives everything--corruption, misuse, ignorance, 
ineptitude. Linking man to man in the dark, it brought man out of the 
dark. It is the human glory which antecedes all others. It merits not only 
our homage but our constant and intelligent study. (Language 198) 
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8. Other Philosophical Implications in 1984 and A Clockwork 
Orange 
 
 
8.1. “Freedom to Say that Two Plus Two Make Four” (1984) 
 
One of the major beliefs Winston Smith holds on to is the mathematical 
statement that “two plus two make four” (1984 84). This fact is something that 
the party cannot deny or change, according to Winston, a fact that cannot be 
altered. Winston deduces from this empirical fact that freedom is the freedom 
to say that two plus two make four, not five. What Winston, or rather Orwell 
himself wishes to state is that there is some kind of objective reality, which no 
human force can negate or change, an objective truth that can be 
experienced and grasped by the human reason. This view proves Orwell to 
be an empiricist, although he himself was probably not even aware of the 
philosophical implications of this view. According to Stephen Ingle Orwell was 
not really fond of philosophy: 
Orwell was fishing in deep waters here. Where did his faith in man‟s 
reason come from? There is no evidence that he ever read Descartes 
or Kant on the nature of the relationship between sense and reason. He 
was unfamiliar with Mill‟s work, though naturally sympathetic to his 
emphasis – or what Berlin called his over-emphasis – on rationality. 
Although towards the end of his life Orwell included amongst his 
acquaintances both A.J. Ayer and Bertrand Russell, he was simply not 
interested in schools of philosophy and had no great capacity for 
philosophical thought. Neither Ayer nor Russell records discussing 
philosophical issues with Orwell. Indeed, in a letter to Richard Rees in 
which he referred to a philosophical argument of Bertrand Russell, 
Orwell wrote: „But I never can follow that kind of thing. It is the sort of 
thing that makes me feel that philosophy should be forbidden by law.‟ 
(Ingle 124, 125) 
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However, Orwell‟s novel is a highly philosophical one, raising issues which 
have been discussed in philosophy for centuries, whether the fact was known 
to him or not. Concerning the statement, “You are no metaphysician, 
Winston” (1984 260) might be understood as the author‟s self-reflective 
remark on his own character. Indeed, metaphysics has little space in 1984, it 
is even denied by the strongly empiricist conviction of the objectivity of nature 
Winston wants and has to defend against the party‟s doctrine – a doctrine 
that promotes constructivism since it constructs the reality of the party 
members.  
You believe that reality is something objective, external, existing in its 
own right. You also believe that the nature of reality is self-evident. 
When you delude yourself into thinking that you see something, you 
assume that everyone else sees the same thing as you. But I tell you, 
Winston, that reality is not external. Reality exists in the human mind, 
and nowhere else. (1984 261) 
 
O‟Brian represents here the principle of relativism and its annihilation of 
objective truth. Relativistic and constructivist theories criticise objectivism 
which relies on the assumption that objective reality, i.e. a reality that exists 
beyond one‟s mind, can be captured by the human reason. Constructivists do 
not deny the existence of an external reality but they deny the conjecture that 
it can be embraced objectively by subjective human mind. The human mind 
as such constructs meaning and knowledge by systemising and categorising 
and, therefore, abstracting external information, and thus it constructs its own 
reality, which is always a product of subjective mental processes.  
 
O‟Brian further adds to his statement that reality exists only in the human 
mind:  
Not in the individual mind, which can make mistakes, and in any case 
soon perishes: only in the mind of the Party, which is collective and 
immortal. Whatever the Party holds to be truth, is truth. It is impossible 
to see reality except by looking through the eyes of the Party. (1984 
261) 
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What O‟Brian addresses here is known by the concept of social 
constructivism, a sociological and psychological theory which purports that 
certain social phenomena, such as certain beliefs or practices which may 
appear natural and evident to the individuals who hold on to them, are in fact 
socially constructed in particular social and historical contexts, may 
differentiate in other contexts, and must not be regarded as laws of nature in 
any way. 
 
However, the party does not construct reality in a pure social constructivist 
sense, where social phenomena develop through the interaction of 
individuals in a particular social environment as a result of social interactive 
and mental processes. The party does much more than to provide and 
establish social contexts where certain concepts and social practices can 
develop and flourish; moreover, it designs and controls the individual 
consciousness, and therefore the collective as well, by exercising the 
methods of manipulation on an extremely ingenuous and elaborate level and 
thus imposing the party‟s dogma upon the party subjects. Goldstein states in 
„his‟ book: 
Reality only exerts its pressure through the needs of everyday life – the 
need to eat and drink, to get shelter and clothing, to avoid swallowing 
poison or stepping out of top-storey windows, and the like. Between life 
and death, and between physical pleasure and pain, there is still a 
distinction, but that is all. Cut off from the contact with the outer world, 
and with the past, the citizen of Oceania is like a man in interstellar 
space, who has no way of knowing which direction is up and which is 
down. The rulers of such a state are absolute, as the Pharaohs or the 
Caesars could not be. They are obliged to prevent their followers from 
starving to death in numbers large enough to be inconvenient, and they 
are obliged to remain at the same low level of military technique as their 
rivals; but once that minimum is achieved, they can twist reality into 
whatever shape they choose. (1984 207) 
 
In other words, the party limits the individual and social autonomy of the 
human thought to a zero minimum by exercising power through applying 
various highly calculated methods of oppression on its subjects just for the 
sake of safeguarding and extending its power. One of these methods is 
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inflicting physical pain, be it by torturing dissidents or by simply keeping the 
population of Oceania hungry in order to maintain control over their bodies 
and their minds.  
„The second thing for you to realise is that power is power over human 
beings. Over the body – but, above all, over the mind. Power over 
matter – external reality, as you would call it, is not important. Already 
our control over matter is absolute […]  
„But how can you control matter?‟ he burst out. „You don‟t even control 
the climate or the law of gravity. And there are disease, pain, death---„. 
[…] 
„We control matter because we control the mind. Reality is inside your 
skull. You will learn by degrees, Winston. There is nothing that we could 
not do. Invisibility, levitation – anything. I could float off this floor like a 
soap bubble if I wished to. I do not wish to, because the party does not 
wish it. You must get rid of those nineteenth-century ideas about the 
laws of Nature. We make the laws of Nature.‟ (1984 277) 
 
 
O‟Brian even states that absolutely “nothing exists except through human 
consciousness”: “Outside man there is nothing.” (1984 278) This could be 
interpreted as a form of radical constructivism which negates the existence of 
any external reality. Further, it can also be read as a perverted  feature of 
Descartes‟s reasoning, who in proclaiming his famous “Cogito, ergo sum!” 
aphorism proceeds from the scepticism about any kind of outer reality, save 
the undeniable fact that he, as a human mind, is thinking and challenging 
anything that could delude him. Only in being sure that his mind is performing 
the act of thinking, he gains assurance of his empirical existence, i.e. only 
from the existence of his mind can he deduce his ontological existence. For, 
anything else that lies outside his mind, even his body, could deceive him 
and lead him astray (see Kunzmann, Burkard, and Wiedmann 105). 
 
Descartes, as a rationalist philosopher naturally believes in the unmistakable 
faculty of cognition of human ratio, or reason - an innate capacity which can 
be exclusively realised by autonomous thinking of free, reflective individuals. 
He attaches most importance to the autonomy of human reason, whereas the 
party systematically destroys autonomy, implies unreason and propagates 
irrationality. Smith, however, manages to grasp and struggles to defend the 
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rational principle by stating “I think I exist. […] I am conscious of my own 
identity.” (1984 272) In saying this he lines up in the Descartes‟s tradition. 
James Ingle argues that by O‟Brian‟s inherent logical absurdity of the claim 
“You do not exist,” it was not Winston‟s argument that was abolished but it 
was Winston as a person (see Ingle 129). 
 
Winston Smith finally gives up his conviction that two plus two results in four, 
however, not because his argument was destroyed, but his person. 
Eventually, O‟Brian does not manage to provide a logically elaborated, non-
contradictory and consistent argument of the party‟s ability to create reality as 
it wishes to. In fact, he reduces his statements to absurdity by claiming that 
no reality ever existed before the advent of humanity, which means the 
advent of the party. Smith and the reader naturally know that there has been 
humanity before the party, and thus some kind of reality. O‟Brian is not able 
to convince Smith by strong conclusive arguments or due to his intellectual 
superiority; he can only do so by inflicting physical pain on him (see Ingle 
128). Therefore, the only reality O‟Brian, or the party in general, is able to 
establish is the reality of power.  
 
Orwell seems to endorse the fact that the reality of “two plus two” will stand 
the test of time and outlive any power relations. Concerning this, Ingle points 
out that “Orwell would have been unaware of the distinction, essential to our 
understanding of empiricism, that Leibnitz had first drawn between analytical 
and synthetic knowledge” (Ingle 125). For, “only analytical knowledge is 
certain, but since it inhabits the world of mathematics and formal logic, it has 
no relevance to the world of experience and value” (Ingle 125). In connection 
to this, Immanuel Kant has also distinguished between a priori and a 
posteriori propositions, defining the former as a proposition whose 
justification does not rely on experience, the latter as a proposition whose 
justification does rely upon experience. Regarding the statement “two plus 
two equals four” it becomes evident that it constitutes an analytic, a priori 
truth that in fact cannot be challenged or annihilated, or as Hannah Arendt 
states, it represents the “only absolutely reliable truth human beings could fall 
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back on” (qtd. in Ingle 125). However, Arendt adds that “this „truth‟ is empty 
or rather no truth at all because it does not reveal anything” (qtd. in Ingle 
125). Obviously, no statements about the nature of values can be deduced 
from analytical propositions, therefore the laws of mathematics cannot be 
applied to matters of human life.  
 
Then, why does Orwell use this simple mathematical computation as a 
symbol for man‟s liberty and autonomy? For the author two plus two stands 
“as a badge of man‟s undeceived intelligence” and “his ability to reach out 
confidently to objective truth and so to stand against the Party” (Ingle 126)  - 
a party which declares itself as the absolute source of truth, and, therefore, 
prohibits individual reasoning or common sense. As Goldstein demonstrates, 
the Party is the enemy of empiricism and common sense; moreover, it is the 
enemy of science:  
The empirical method of thought, on which all the scientific 
achievements of the past were founded, is opposed to the most 
fundamental principles of Ingsoc. And even technological progress only 
happens when its products can in some way be used for the diminution 
of human liberty.  
[...] 
The two aims of the Party are to conquer the whole surface of the earth 
and to extinguish once and for all the possibility of independent thought. 
(1984 201) 
 
 
It appears evident that in a social and political system which imposes 
irrationality and promotes ignorance as strength, applying logical reasoning 
and independent thought represents an act of rebellion and self-liberation 
from the party‟s doctrine. In another environment, for instance in our current 
western society, where reason and scientific thought represent the 
predominant and most accepted system of thought, rationality may even be 
experienced as oppressive, whereas irrationality as liberating. Dostoevsky, 
for instance, was a strong opponent of the hegemony of reason and an 
advocate of man‟s “own free and unfettered volition, one‟s own caprice, 
however wild” (Dostoevsky, qtd. in Ingle 127). According to Dostoevsky, only 
in rejecting the hegemonic imposition of rationality and by pursuing one‟s 
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own volition one can truly sustain one‟s autonomy and identity. So, if we 
contrast Orwell‟s and Dostoevsky‟s point of view, we can observe that 
despite the different outcomes of their arguments, both standpoints have one 
thing in common: Their lowest common denominator is the fact that both 
seek individual autonomy and liberty by questioning the hegemonic system of 
thought within a political system and, therefore, questioning the power 
relations. 
 
When it comes to the liberating power of reason, we should first mention the 
name of Immanuel Kant, the most prominent philosopher of the European 
Enlightenment, whose “Sapere aude!” proclamation was the motto of the Age 
of Reason. In his famous and very influential essay An Answer to the 
Question: What is Enlightenment? (1784), Kant declares: 
Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-imposed immaturity. 
Immaturity is the inability to use one's understanding without guidance 
from another. This immaturity is self-imposed when its cause lies not in 
lack of understanding, but in lack of resolve and courage to use it 
without guidance from another. Sapere Aude! [dare to know] "Have 
courage to use your own understanding!"--that is the motto of 
enlightenment. (Kant par. 1) 
 
Kant further argues that laziness and cowardice are two reasons why so 
many people stay in a state of lifelong immaturity and why it is so easy for 
others to establish their power and take over the supervision over those who 
prefer to be immature. For, it is easy to let others do the thinking while one 
does not have to exert oneself at all. “Others will readily undertake the 
irksome work for me.” (Kant par. 2) And those who declare themselves as 
supervisors or guardians are interested in maintaining their power, so they let 
the immature believe that the step to maturity is difficult, even dangerous. 
The individual human is thereby threatened by the danger of falling should he 
attempt to walk alone. 
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Thus, it is difficult for any individual man to work himself out of the 
immaturity that has all but become his nature. He has even become 
fond of this state and for the time being is actually incapable of using his 
own understanding, for no one has ever allowed him to attempt it. Rules 
and formulas, those mechanical aids to the rational use, or rather 
misuse, of his natural gifts, are the shackles of a permanent immaturity. 
Whoever threw them off would still make only an uncertain leap over 
the smallest ditch, since he is unaccustomed to this kind of free 
movement. Consequently, only a few have succeeded, by cultivating 
their own minds, in freeing themselves from immaturity and pursuing a 
secure course. (Kant par. 3) 
 
Kant adds that the public as a whole is more likely to enlighten itself than the 
individual alone. Also, enlightenment should be understood as a slow and 
tedious process, for it is very difficult to reform a manner of thinking. 
Furthermore, what is most required for such enlightenment is freedom, 
“namely, the freedom to use reason publicly in all matters.” (Kant par. 5) 
 
It can be stated that the main idea of Kant‟s enlightenment philosophy in 
general was rational self-determination on a personal and a political level 
with reason functioning as the prime arbiter of right and wrong. Here it must 
be considered that Kant regarded reason as a distinctively human 
characteristic which all human beings posses and are capable of. Reason, 
according to Kant, is the characteristic feature which distinguishes humans 
from other beings. Moreover, only by applying reason a human can reach 
self-fulfillment as a human.  
 
If we compare Kant‟s philosophy of reason with Orwell‟s philosophical 
tendencies in 1984 Kant‟s impact on the author should become evident, 
although Orwell may not been aware of it. Orwell‟s protagonist Smith 
emerges from his immaturity by using his reason symbolised in the “two plus 
two” calculus. In fact, Smith dares to commit thoughtcrime by questioning the 
nature of truth and reality through applying his own ratio. He dares to think, to 
use his own understanding and in doing so he follows Kant‟s appeal of 
sapere aude. In 1984 laziness and cowardice can also be seen as the two 
main reasons for the immaturity of the population of Oceania, although the 
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situation in this dystopian state is more awkward than Kant has ever 
imagined. The methods of terror and manipulation which the party imposes 
on its members are artfully elaborated in the minutest detail. Nevertheless, 
were the party members more courageous and the proles less lazy to think 
for themselves and to stand up collectively against the party, they could 
easily overthrow the oppressive party despotism and its irrational dogmas.  
 
 
 
8.2. “A Man Who Cannot Choose Ceases to Be a Man”  
(A Clockwork Orange) 
 
 
Anthony Burgess‟s A Clockwork Orange is a dystopian novel, which – as is 
typical of the genre – is meant as a warning and critique of certain 
contemporary developments. Burgess himself suspected his own work to be 
“too didactic to be artistic”, “pure art dragged into the arena of morality” 
(Clockwork xxii). Novelists, it is said, should show, not tell; however, the 
genre of dystopian science fiction invariably contains a philosophical 
message. Burgess himself wrote two other science fiction novels, or „futfics‟, 
as he calls them: The Wanting Seed (1962) and 1985 (1978), a tribute to 
George Orwell‟s 1984 which had deeply impressed and inspired him (see 
Clockwork xxii). “Dystopias or cacotopias are only a kind of warning to hang 
on to what freedom one has,” Burgess once said (Clockwork xxii). The 
freedom which he felt threatened and compelled to discuss in A Clockwork 
Orange was that of individual choice.  
  
The novel was Burgess‟s angry pillorying of the behaviourist methods of 
social planning as discussed in the 1950s. His main target was the 
psychologist B.F. Skinner, an heir of Ivan Pavlov and the inventor of operant 
conditioning, who believed that the experiments he had carried out on 
animals concerning behaviour modification could be transformed to the 
human domain as well.  
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[...] Skinner wanted to abolish notions of man as an autonomous, free 
agent, and had a vision of a planned society. His „inventions‟ included 
teaching machines and mechanical baby-minders, and he also 
published a utopian novel, Walden Two, which imagines a society 
where „We can achieve a sort of control under which the controlled, 
though they are following a code much more scrupulously than was 
ever the case under the old system, now feel free‟. (Clockwork xxii) 
 
Skinner, who was a strong advocate of determinism and hence did not 
believe in free will, regarded the human mind in technological terms and held 
the conviction that human behaviour can be designed on the basis of 
behaviourist principles. In his book published in 1971, Beyond Freedom and 
Dignity, the psychologist promotes his social world view which illustrates both 
his aversion to free will and to dualism as well as his reasons for claiming 
that a person's history of environmental interactions controls his or her 
behavior. (see Graham ch.6) 
 
Burgess has strongly opposed to Skinner‟s theories and when he realised 
that behaviorist methods of reforming criminals were already tested in 
American prisons with the objective to minimise individual autonomy for the 
sake of a higher goal, and that British politicians were already demanding 
that criminals should be conditioned to be good, Burgess finally had enough: 
“I began to see red and felt that I had to write the book" (qtd. in Aggeler 173) 
In the middle section of A Clockwork Orange Burgess incorporates the 
argument against mind-control and makes it an explicit part of the novel‟s 
texture. During the public demonstration of Alex‟s conversion from evil to 
good, the prison charlie fuels a debate about free choice with Dr Brodsky, 
whose character is a clear allusion to B.F. Skinner: 
„Choice,‟ rumbled a rich deep goloss99. I viddied100 it belonged to the 
prison charlie. „He has no real choice, has he? Self-interest, fear of 
physical pain, drove him to that grotesque act of self-abasement. Its 
insincerity was clearly to be seen. He ceases to be a wrongdoer. He 
ceases also to be a creature capable of moral choice.‟ 
„These are subtleties,‟ like smiled Dr Brodsky. „We are not concerned 
with motive, with higher ethics. We are concerned only with cutting 
                                                          
99
 Nadsat: voice. 
100
 Nadsat: to see. 
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down crime-‟         
„And‟ chipped in this bolshy101 well-dressed Minister, „with relieving the 
ghastly congestion in our prisons.‟  [...] 
„Me, me, me. How about me? Where do I come into all this? Am I like 
just some animal or dog? [...] Am I just to be like a clock-work orange?‟ 
(Clockwork 94)  
 
Apart from the omission of the last chapter, Stanley Kubrick‟s film also 
represents the prison chaplain in a different light. In Burgess‟s novel the 
priest is, despite his addiction to alcohol and his initial cowardice to protest 
against the treatment, the only character with a sense of right and wrong; and 
moreover, the only one to sincerely mean well with Alex (see Wenzl 46). He 
is the only one to realise the deeper meaning and the consequences of the 
conditioning into a good person and to warn Alex: 
The question is whether such a technique can really make a man good.  
Goodness comes from within, 6655321. Goodness is something 
chosen. When a man cannot choose he ceases to be a man. 
(Clockwork 63) 
 
In Kubrick‟s film, however, the prison chaplain is represented as a slapstick 
character who is all too easily silenced when he is told that the Ludovico‟s 
technique will turn the subject into a perfect Christian: 
This difference in characterization - Kubrick mocks whereas Burgess 
slightly satirizes – is clearly based on their different philosophical points 
of view. For the atheist Stanley Kubrick faith is just another form of 
institutionalised oppression, but for the Catholic Burgess, even if he has 
officially left the Church decades ago, religion still includes the 
possibility of hope and salvation. (Wenzl 47) 
 
Indeed, the novel is intended as an allegory of Christian free will with 
Burgess supporting the chaplain in the conviction that Alex must be able to 
autonomously choose to be good. Burgess does not only share the 
“Augustinian view of man as a fallen creature, he also has a great deal of 
non-Augustinian hope for him as a creature of growth and potential 
goodness” (Aggeler 181). The distinction between Augustinianism and 
Pelagianism was one Burgess himself often made: “St Augustine thought that 
                                                          
101
 Nadsat: big. 
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man is born in original sin, the monk Pelagius denied the doctrine.” 
(Clockwork xii) According to Burgess, these two teachings provide the basis 
for liberalism and communism, on the one hand, and conservatism, on the 
other hand. The writer considers them the ultimate origins of Western 
philosophy (see Wenzl 23) and he places the tension between these two 
doctrines at the centre of A Clockwork Orange.  
 
In utilitarian philosophy, according to which an action is right if it tends to 
maximise the happiness, not of the individual agent alone, but of a greatest 
number possible, the freedom and the happiness of the individual is less 
worth than the utility for a human generality. Utilitarianism focuses on the 
consequences of an act, rather than on the intrinsic motives of the agent. 
Thus, the motives of an action may be bad, yet if the consequences are 
good, the utilitarian is quite satisfied. Related to Alex, his conditioning 
perfectly fits into the utilitarian ethics, for his loss of freedom implies the 
increase of freedom and happiness of many others who are now safe from 
his possible attacks; furthermore however shaped his intrinsic motives may 
be, if the way he eventually acts is socially desirable, the end justifies the 
means. Therefore, in utilitarian terms the conditioning of criminals into good 
is absolutely acceptable. In Christian ethics however, the man is and should 
remain autonomous in his moral responsibility, since “what a person does 
against his will is not his own credit, even if what he does is good in itself” (St 
Augustine, qtd in Wenzl 45). 
 
For Anthony Burgess there is absolutely no moral justification for human 
conditioning, as he makes unmistakably clear in his 1971 essay Clockwork 
Marmalade:  
Hitler was, unfortunately, a human being, and if we could have 
countenanced the conditioning of one human being we would have to 
accept it for all. Hitler was a great nuisance, but history has known 
others disruptive enough to make the state‟s fingers itch – Christ, 
Luther, Bruno, even H.D. Lawrence. One has to be genuinely 
philosophical about this, however much one has suffered. I don‟t know 
how much free will man really possesses (Wagner‟s Hans Sachs said: 
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Wir sind ein wenig frei – “we are a little free”) but I do know that what 
little he seems to have is too precious to encroach on, however good 
the intentions of the encroacher may be. (qtd in Aggeler 181) 
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9. Conclusion 
 
 
The primary aim of this thesis has been to analyse the aspects of human 
liberty as depicted by George Orwell and Anthony Burgess in the dystopian 
novels 1984 and A Clockwork Orange. Since freedom is a philosophical 
concept and the methodological approach in this M.A. thesis is an 
interdisciplinary one, the major problem was to find an appropriate 
philosophical theory of human freedom which could be applied to the literary 
works of Orwell and Burgess. In fact, very few concepts other than freedom 
have been given so many different and controversial definitions and 
interpretations depending on the ideological approach of different schools of 
philosophy.  Eventually, Isaiah Berlin‟s definition of Two Concepts of Liberty 
proved to be a suitable basis for the analysis of the two novels. Berlin 
distinguishes between a positive and a negative notion of liberty, the latter 
being defined as liberty from outer interference, the former as liberty to 
autonomously fulfil one‟s potential. One could also relate negative liberty to 
political freedom, since it describes the area over which a human being is 
free from outer interference and coercion, whereas positive liberty refers to a 
more metaphysical conception of inner autonomy to use one‟s inherent 
capacities. Berlin points out that both concepts have been misused and 
perverted into their opposite in the course of history, especially positive 
liberty, which by definition distinguishes between a higher nature and a lower 
nature of the self: the higher referring to rationality and idealism and thus 
being regarded as the true and free self, the lower to irrational passions, 
desires and other human vices. Berlin demonstrates that especially the 
totalitarian systems of the twentieth century, but also other collectives like the 
Church have often misused the positive concept of liberty to coerce 
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individuals in the name of their true self and, therefore, in the name of liberty 
by imposing the paternalistic principle on them. Although my original 
assumption was that the negative concept fits more to Orwell‟s 1984 with the 
positive one being more immanent in Burgess‟s A Clockwork Orange, my 
analysis finally has shown that both novels deal with both aspects of liberty – 
the positive as well as the negative concepts. 
 
In 1984 the manifestations of an extremely limited area of negative liberty 
become evident in the massive interference on the part of the regime in the 
private lives of the Party members: the citizens live under constant 
surveillance of the telescreens, their lives are strictly regulated by the Party, 
and their human rights are completely ignored. Only the lower class, the 
proles, are left alone since they are not considered dangerous to the system. 
As far as the aspects of positive liberty are concerned, Orwell depicts what 
Berlin has described as a perverted notion of positive liberty, for the Ingsoc 
regime sets itself as being in fact the „true‟ guardian of liberty and, therefore, 
it justifies the imposing of its collective will upon its members in order to 
achieve its own, and thus their „higher‟ freedom. Through manipulation 
techniques, such as doublethink, propaganda and the invention of Newspeak 
the Party narrows down the capacity of positive liberty of the party members 
and it establishes a vast system of mind control. Especially the systematic 
reduction of language leads to a decline of independent thought by simply 
eliminating the concepts of political values of liberty, equality, justice etc.  
 
In A Clockwork Orange we have a very playful use of language as well, 
which, however, symbolises an extension of the area of negative liberty: 
Stretching the limits of the English language by speaking an Anglo-Russian 
vernacular called Nadsat, Alex, the protagonist, stretches the area of his civil 
rights and, as a consequence, infringes the rights of his fellow men. The 
young boy and his gang terrorise the society they live in until Alex is 
imprisoned for murder and used as a guinea pig for a psychological 
experiment, which seeks to condition criminals into good citizens. The so 
called Ludovico Technique makes Alex experience nausea and pain each 
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time he tries to perform an act of violence, be it only for reasons of self-
defence. Furthermore, the sexual desire and Alex‟s joy of classical music, 
especially Beethoven, are made impossible as well. Thus, the negative 
liberty of the narrator is seriously limited, since he can only behave in 
accordance with the conditioning and has no free choice. In A Clockwork 
Orange we have a perverted conception of positive liberty as well, for the 
government imposes the treatment on the young criminal applying the 
paternalistic principle, which implies that the treatment is done for Alex‟s own 
good and in the name of his true liberty. Burgess, however, strongly opposes 
the conditioning of men into good persons holding that free moral choice is 
one of the main characteristics of a human being and when an individual 
cannot choose autonomously between good and bad he/ she is also deprived 
of the possibility of moral growth. For this reason, he eventually lets his 
protagonist grow up and become a good person without being impelled 
towards it. Anthony Burgess was obviously convinced that humans are 
inherently good and capable of learning and growing in moral terms; that is 
why he was upset at the US edition and Stanley Kubrick‟s film adaption of his 
novel, which omit Burgess‟s last chapter and thus ignore his moral message.  
 
Both novels contain several philosophical implications and can be analysed 
according to various philosophical point of views. The aspect and the issue of 
human liberty, however, represents the main focus of my thesis, and, in my 
opinion, it was also the writers‟ main intention to demonstrate what scenarios 
of human freedom or rather unfreedom are theoretically possible in 
imaginable political systems; or as Burgess put it: “Dystopias [...] are only a 
kind of warning to hang on to what freedom one has.” (Clockwork xxii) 
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12. Abstract 
 
Die britischen Schriftsteller, George Orwell (1903 – 1950)  und Anthony 
Burgess (1917 – 1993), die zu den exzeptionellen Ausnahmekünstlern des 
20. Jahrhunderts gezählt werden, verdanken ihren Ruhm hauptsächlich ihren 
großen dystopischen Romanen 1984 (Orwell) und Uhrwerk Orange 
(Burgess). Eine Dystopie wird als die negative Form der Utopie definiert und 
zeichnet sich dadurch aus, dass sie beunruhigende Tendenzen des 
Zeitgeistes, ins Besondere im politischen, wissenschaftlichen und sozialen 
Bereich, aufgreift und in einer übertriebenen, satirischen Form in die Zukunft 
projiziert. Im Allgemeinen behandelt eine Dystopie eine zukünftige 
Gesellschaft, die von einer despotisch herrschenden Regierung unterdrückt 
wird, welche die Freiheit des Einzelnen und andere Grundwerte, wie die 
Menschenrechte, gänzlich ignoriert und verletzt. Auch in 1984 und in 
Uhrwerk Orange wird der Leser mit politischen bzw. gesellschaftlichen 
Systemen konfrontiert, welche das Individuum in seiner Freiheit rigoros 
unterdrücken. Das primäre Ziel dieser Diplomarbeit ist es daher die Aspekte 
der Freiheit bzw. Unfreiheit in den beiden Romanen zu analysieren und 
einander gegenüber zu stellen. Bedenkt man, dass Freiheit an sich ein 
philosophischer Begriff ist, zu dem es seit Anbeginn der Philosophie 
unterschiedlichste Konzeptionen und Theorien gegeben hat, besteht die 
erste Schwierigkeit darin, eine Theorie der Freiheit zu finden, die im Stande 
ist die beiden Romane aufzugreifen und mit einem soliden Fundament für 
weitere Analysen auszustatten. Isaiah Berlins Konzeption von Freiheit, die 
den Begriff in einen negativen („Freiheit von“) und positiven („Freiheit zu“) 
unterteilt, erweist sich hierbei als die beste Basis für diese Zwecke. Die 
negative Freiheit wird hierbei als Freiheit von äußeren Zwängen verstanden, 
welche das Verhalten des Individuums einschränken oder verhindern; die 
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positive Freiheit bezieht sich eher auf die innere Fähigkeit bzw. das Potential 
eines Individuums seine selbst gesteckten Ziele zu erreichen. Beide 
Konzeptionen und deren pervertierte Formen können in beiden Romanen 
festgestellt werden. 
 
In 1984 manifestiert sich eine extreme Form von negativer Unfreiheit darin, 
dass die Einwohner des dystopischen Staates Ozeanien von der totalitären 
Regierung mit ihrem Führer, dem Großen Bruder, in ihren Grundfreiheiten 
absolut unterdrückt werden. Es handelt sich hierbei um ein massives 
Eingreifen seitens des Staates in das soziale, berufliche und, ins Besondere, 
private Leben der Menschen, welches durch Vorrichtungen wie überall 
aufgestellte Bildschirme, die gleichzeitig Propaganda Nachrichten senden, 
und – und darin liegt ihre Spezialität – wie eine Videokamera fungieren, 
ständig überwacht und kontrolliert wird. Die Aspekte der positiven 
(Un)Freiheit lassen sich an Manipulationstechniken, wie Doppeldenk und 
Neusprech analysieren, welche die Kapazitäten der positiven Freiheit darin 
einengen, dass sie das autonome Denken nahezu unmöglich machen, indem 
sie ein System der absoluten Gedankenkontrolle errichten.  
 
Im Uhrwerk Orange wird dem Leser ein Protagonist präsentiert, der die 
Grenzen seiner negativen Freiheit permanent auszuweiten bestrebt ist, dabei 
allerdings die Rechte und Freiheiten seiner Mitmenschen konsequent 
verletzt. Der Junge Alex und seine Bande (droogs) terrorisieren die 
Gesellschaft in der sie leben und erinnern in ihrem aggressiven, 
rücksichtslosen Verhalten an jenen philosophischen Naturzustand, den 
Thomas Hobbes als einen „Krieg jeder gegen jeden“ bezeichnet hat. Diesem 
Treiben wird ein jähes Ende gesetzt, als Alex inhaftiert wird und sich freiwillig 
bereit erklärt an einem psychologischen Experiment teilzunehmen, welches 
ihn zu einem besseren Menschen machen und deswegen vorzeitig aus dem 
Gefängnis entlassen soll. Das Experiment jedoch, operiert auf der Basis der 
operanten und instrumentellen Konditionierung entwickelt vom Behavioristen 
B.F. Skinner, und bewirkt, dass Alex keine freie Wahl über seine Handlungen 
mehr besitzt, sondern nur noch entsprechend der Konditionierung agieren 
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kann. Somit ist seine Freiheit komplett eingestellt, denn er hat keine 
Möglichkeit mehr zwischen Gut und Böse zu entscheiden. Anthony Burgess 
empfand es allerdings als notwendig, dass ein Mensch autonom seine Taten 
wählen kann und er kritisierte scharf das Prinzip des Paternalismus, welches 
vorsieht, dass über einen Menschen seitens eines Kollektives, z.B. des 
Staates, zu „seinem eigenen Besten“ entschieden werden darf. Burgess„ 
moralische Botschaft hinter Uhrwerk Orange besagt, dass der Mensch kein 
Uhrwerk ist, welches man programmieren kann, im Gegenteil, er ist ein 
Wesen, das gerade dadurch ausgezeichnet und definiert wird, dass es 
autonom entscheiden kann und moralisch zu wachsen im Stande ist. Um 
seine positive Freiheit zu erreichen, so Burgess, bedarf es keines Einwirkens 
von außen – vielmehr kann die eigene positive Freiheit, die „wahre und 
höhere Natur des selbst“ nur aus sich selbst heraus entstehen.  
 
Beide Romane, 1984 und Uhrwerk Orange, liefern ein großes Spektrum an 
kritischen Überlegungen und können aus verschiedenen philosophischen 
Perspektiven beleuchten werden. Die Idee der menschlichen Freiheit steht 
jedoch im Mittelpunkt der beiden Werke und somit auch im Fokus dieser 
Diplomarbeit.  
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